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NOTES
The Better Way to Stop Delay:
Analyzing Speedy Sentencing Claims
in the Wake of Betterman v. Montana
In Betterman v. Montana, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial right terminates after a defendant’s
conviction. In dicta, the Court suggested that a defendant might pursue
a constitutional claim of undue sentencing delay under the Due Process
Clause. Lower courts have generally embraced this suggestion. Still, the
Betterman Court’s limited holding left certain questions open: What
analytical framework is appropriate to address due process claims of
delay between conviction and sentencing? And if a court finds that
sentencing was unduly delayed, what is the proper relief?
After Betterman, some courts have analyzed postconviction delay
using Barker v. Wingo’s four factors: length of delay, reason for delay,
defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Other
courts have used United States v. Lovasco’s two-prong test: the
defendant must demonstrate that he suffered actual prejudice and the
government delayed in bad faith. This Note advocates for adopting the
more flexible balancing test established by Barker but argues that
Barker’s traditional remedy for undue delay (dismissal of charges) is
inappropriate in the sentencing context. Instead, this Note proposes a
default remedy in which a defendant’s sentence is reduced by the amount
of delay if a speedy sentencing violation is proven.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 19, 2012, Brandon Betterman pleaded guilty to bail
jumping.1 The court ordered him to return to the local jail to await his
sentencing hearing.2 And indeed, Betterman waited—it took fourteen
months before he was sentenced.3
1.
Brief for Petitioner at 4, Betterman v. Montana (Betterman II), 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016)
(No. 14-1457).
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
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After his sentencing, Betterman appealed, asserting that the
delay between his conviction and sentencing violated his Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial.4 At the time, state and federal
courts disagreed as to whether the speedy trial right applied at the
sentencing phase.5 Unfortunately for Betterman, the Montana
Supreme Court held that the right does not extend after conviction.6
The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari in Betterman
v. Montana to resolve the split.7 The Court agreed with Montana,
holding that the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause ceases to
apply after a defendant’s conviction or guilty plea.8 The Court
emphasized that the only relief available for a Speedy Trial Clause
violation—automatic dismissal of a defendant’s charges—would be
inappropriate for undue sentencing delay.9
Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, suggested in
dicta that a defendant might nevertheless be afforded constitutional
relief under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.10 The vast majority of courts addressing postconviction
delay after Betterman have accordingly employed some form of due
process analysis.11 Yet, because Betterman only presented a Speedy
Trial Clause question, the Court’s limited holding did not conclude
which framework would apply to constitutional claims alleging
postconviction delay12 or what the proper relief would be for delayed
sentencing.13

4.
State v. Betterman (Betterman I), 342 P.3d 971, 972 (Mont. 2015); see U.S. CONST. amend.
VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial . . . .”).
5.
See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1613 & n.1 (acknowledging a court split).
6.
Betterman I, 342 P.3d at 978.
7.
Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1613.
8.
Id.
9.
Id. at 1615.
10. See id. at 1612 (“For inordinate delay in sentencing, although the Speedy Trial Clause
does not govern, a defendant may have other recourse, including, in appropriate circumstances,
tailored relief under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”); see also
Figueroa v. Buechele, No. 15-2972 (CCC), 2016 WL 3457013, at *4 (D.N.J. June 23, 2016)
(recognizing as dicta the Betterman Court’s suggestion that relief might be sought via a due process
claim).
11. See infra notes 167–172 and accompanying text (summarizing and collecting
postconviction-delay cases after Betterman).
12. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1618 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“We have never decided
whether the Due Process Clause creates an entitlement to a reasonably prompt sentencing
hearing. Today’s opinion leaves us free to decide the proper analytical framework to analyze such
claims if and when the issue is properly before us.”); id. at 1619 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting
the question of the “appropriate test for such a Due Process Clause challenge . . . is an open one”).
13. The Court was clear that automatic dismissal was an inappropriate remedy; however, the
majority did not propose an alternative remedy. See id. at 1615 (majority opinion) (noting that the
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Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence—and implicitly the majority
opinion as well14—proposed analyzing undue sentencing delay under
the four-factor balancing test from Barker v. Wingo, which contemplates
“the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant” when scrutinizing
delays between a defendant’s arrest or charge and trial.15 After
Betterman, several courts have applied Barker to Due Process Clause
claims of postconviction delay.16 Other courts,17 however, have looked
to United States v. Lovasco, which provides a strict two-prong test to
analyze Due Process Clause claims of precharge delay—the court must
consider if the reason for delay violates “fundamental conceptions of
justice,” and the defendant must show actual prejudice as a result of
the delay.18 Today, courts are generally split over whether the Barker
factors or the Lovasco test should apply to delayed sentencing claims.19
This Note addresses the split by advocating for adoption of the Barker
factors to analyze sentencing delay but with a modified remedy scheme
that is more appropriate for sentencing than dismissal of the
defendant’s charges, which Barker traditionally requires.
Part I provides background on the criminal prosecution process
and describes why sentencing delay is troubling.20 Part II then explores
how the pre-Betterman split mirrors the post-Betterman divide over
Barker versus Lovasco—courts that applied the Speedy Trial Clause
used Barker, while courts that rejected the Speedy Trial Clause often

“sole remedy” for a Speedy Trial Clause violation is dismissal of charges and that dismissal would
be an unjustified windfall for a speedy sentencing violation).
14. See infra notes 165–166 and accompanying text (explaining how Justice Ginsburg listed
in a footnote the four factors from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), as reasonable
considerations for sentencing delay but did not explicitly cite or endorse Barker by name); see also
Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1618 n.12 (suggesting in a footnote that courts could consider the
“length of and reasons for delay, the defendant’s diligence in requesting expeditious sentencing,
and prejudice”).
15. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1619 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Barker, 407 U.S. at 529–30;
see United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321 (1971) (explaining that the speedy trial right
attaches upon arrest or charge, but not before).
16. See cases cited infra notes 168–169.
17. See cases cited infra notes 168–169.
18. See 431 U.S. 783, 788–90 (1977) (“[P]roof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not
sufficient element of a due process claim, and . . . the due process inquiry must consider the
reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused.”); id. at 790–91 (“It requires no
extended argument to establish that prosecutors do not deviate from ‘fundamental conceptions of
justice’ when they defer seeking indictments until they have probable cause to believe an accused
is guilty.”); see also infra Section II.B.2 (analyzing how courts have employed the Lovasco factors).
19. See 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.4(f) (4th ed. 2015 & Supp.
2017–2018) (noting that some courts following Betterman have employed the Barker factors while
others have used Lovasco).
20. See infra Part I.
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employed a Lovasco due process analysis.21 Accordingly, courts’ preBetterman rationale is particularly salient to understanding the
current division between these two approaches. Part III discusses the
merits and disadvantages of the Barker and Lovasco frameworks and
their respective remedies, and it considers how each framework’s
original purpose applies to postconviction delay. In Part IV, this Note
proposes that the Barker factors be used to analyze sentencing delay
due process claims. While the Barker test should be adopted, courts
should adopt a less aggressive remedy. Specifically, this Note advocates
that courts should, as a default, reduce a defendant’s sentence by the
amount of delay if a speedy sentencing violation is proven.
I. A CAUSE FOR CONCERN: WHY UNDUE DELAY IN
SENTENCING MATTERS
Sentencing delays happen for a number of reasons, and
defendants’ protections against undue delay vary in each phase of their
criminal prosecution. Section I.A describes each phase and the
corresponding protections against delay. It also explains why bifurcated
proceedings are outside the scope of the sentencing proceedings to
which Betterman and this Note pertain. Section I.B explores why delay
is detrimental to both defendants’ and society’s interests.
A. Protections Against Delay in Criminal Prosecutions
As Betterman succinctly explains, criminal prosecutions unfold
in three phases.22 In each phase, the suspect or defendant has at least
some protection against delay.23 In the first phase, the government
decides whether a suspect should be arrested and charged.24 The
Supreme Court held in Lovasco that the Due Process Clause provides
suspects with constitutional protection against undue prosecutorial
delay.25 Both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process
Clauses provide that individuals shall not be deprived of “life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.”26 If a defendant’s due process
21. See infra Part II.
22. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1613 (2016).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789, 795 & n.17 (1977) (explaining that the
Due Process Clause protects against “oppressive delay,” which the defendant can demonstrate by
proving actual prejudice that resulted from unreasonable delay by the prosecutor); see also
Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1613 (citing Lovasco).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V (pertaining to the federal government, providing that “[n]o person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”); id. amend. XIV, § 1
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rights are violated, the court should try to “counteract any resulting
prejudice” proven by the defendant.27
Second, once the suspect is arrested or charged, he must be tried
as a criminal defendant or strike a plea deal with the prosecutor; during
this phase, the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty.28
As the Supreme Court explained in Barker,29 the Sixth Amendment’s
Speedy Trial Clause protects defendants from delay between arrest or
charge and trial.30 If a court finds a Speedy Trial Clause violation, the
defendant’s charges must be dismissed.31 The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that dismissal is an “unsatisfactorily severe remedy,”32
but the Court has nevertheless upheld this remedy because the speedy
trial right is unique.33 Unlike other Sixth Amendment trial guarantees,
a new trial would not cure a Speedy Trial Clause violation, because it
would not negate—in fact, it would only worsen—the emotional stress
and postponed rehabilitation associated with trial delays.34
Third, the defendant’s conviction concludes the trial phase, and
the defendant enters the sentencing phase.35 In the federal system, the
average time elapsed between conviction and sentencing is just over

(applying due process to the states, prohibiting them from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law”).
27. Burkett v. Cunningham (Burkett I), 826 F.2d 1208, 1222 (3d Cir. 1987).
28. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1613 (“Once charged, the suspect stands accused but is
presumed innocent until conviction upon trial or guilty plea.”).
29. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515 (1972) (“[A] speedy trial is guaranteed the accused
by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution . . . .”); see also United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,
321 (1971) (holding that the speedy trial right commences upon arrest or charge).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial.”); see Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1613–14 (first citing Barker, 407 U.S.
at 532–33; and then citing Marion, 404 U.S. at 320) (explaining that the Speedy Trial Clause
protects the period from arrest or charge through conviction and protects defendants from the risks
of delayed trial).
31. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1615 (“The sole remedy for a violation of the speedy trial
right [is] dismissal of the charges . . . .” (citing Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973);
Barker, 407 U.S. at 522)).
32. Barker, 407 U.S. at 522.
33. See Strunk, 412 U.S. at 439–40 (explaining that the denial of the speedy trial right is
unlike the denial of other Sixth Amendment guarantees and confirming that dismissal must
remain the only remedy for a speedy trial violation).
34. See id. at 439 (describing how denying the Sixth Amendment rights to an impartial jury
or public trial, for example, could be remedied by a new trial but the same is not true of the speedy
trial right).
35. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1613 (holding that the speedy trial right “detaches upon
conviction, when this second stage ends”). A defendant’s conviction may be by trial or by guilty
plea. See id. (explaining that the presumption of innocence lasts “until conviction upon trial or
guilty plea”).
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three months.36 The defendant is often incarcerated during this time.37
Much of the wait can be attributed to the creation of the presentence
report, which is prepared by the probation office after the defendant’s
conviction.38 The report includes detailed information about the
defendant’s personal and criminal history, recommends an appropriate
type and length of punishment, and may provide information needed to
calculate restitution.39 In fashioning a sentence, the court may consider
an array of information, including the presentence report, trial
evidence, victim statements, defendant testimony, witness testimony,
and other submissions by the defense and prosecution.40 In contrast to
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard at trial, the burden of proof for
the sentencing hearing is the lower preponderance of the evidence
standard.41
After conviction and during the sentencing phase, the defendant
is no longer presumed innocent.42 Consequently, Betterman held, the
defendant does not enjoy a postconviction speedy trial right, because
the Speedy Trial Clause only protects the accused.43 Still, defendants
retain some protection against sentencing delay.44 Justice Ginsburg
pointed out that defendants can often seek statutory relief under
applicable federal or state rules of criminal procedure.45 Moreover, as
prefaced earlier, the Betterman Court suggested that the Due Process
36. See id. at 1616 n.8 (citing the U.S. solicitor general’s claim that the “the median time
between conviction and sentencing in 2014 was 99 days”).
37. See id. at 1617 n.9 (explaining that there is presumption against bail in this circumstance
but that the sentencing court may credit the defendant with time served).
38. See id. at 1617–18, 1618 n.8.
39. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 19, § 26.5(b) (explaining that the report may include an
interview with the defendant; include information about the defendant’s prior criminal record;
state other information about the defendant, such as employment, education, family, finances, and
medical history; state information about the victim; make recommendations regarding probation
or imprisonment and any conditions that should be imposed; and, under a presumptive-sentencing
system, respond to certain offense characteristics, such as providing information sufficient for the
court to order restitution). The defendant may usually request correction of the report before it is
finalized. See id. § 26.5(c) (observing that it used to be standard to keep the report from the
defendant but that jurisdictions now more commonly disclose them).
40. Id. § 26.5(b).
41. See id. § 26.4(h) (“[T]he Court has upheld as consistent with due process a burden of proof
for facts used in setting the sentence within the range authorized for the offense of conviction that
is lower than the burden of proof applied when determining elements of an offense.”).
42. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1618 (explaining that conviction “terminates the presumption
of innocence”).
43. Id. at 1614–15, 1618 (determining, based on Court precedent, history, and the text of the
Speedy Trial Clause, that the speedy trial right only protects the accused and “does not extend
beyond conviction”).
44. Id. at 1617.
45. Id. at 1617 & n.10 (asserting that “[t]he primary safeguard comes from statutes and rules”
and collecting examples of state provisions similar to the federal rule); see also FED. R. CRIM. P.
32(b)(1) (“The court must impose sentence without unnecessary delay.”).
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Clause could provide a constitutional “backstop” to protect defendants
against undue sentencing delay.46
Although Betterman held that the speedy trial right terminates
at the end of the trial phase,47 the Court reserved the question of
“whether the Speedy Trial Clause applies to bifurcated proceedings in
which, at the sentencing stage, facts that could increase the prescribed
sentencing range are determined.”48 Such bifurcated proceedings
function more like part of a defendant’s trial than do sentencing
proceedings after conviction.49 Importantly, facts that raise the
sentencing range, except for the fact of a prior conviction, must be
treated as elements of a greater offense and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.50 Because the standard of proof is higher for these sentenceraising facts than for facts at a sentencing hearing,51 more factual
development may be necessary. Relatedly, a court in a bifurcated
proceeding cannot place as much reliance on the presentence report;
while a sentencing court may credit information included in the
presentence report, even hearsay,52 a sentence-raising fact cannot be
46. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1617.
47. Id. at 1613 (holding that the speedy trial right “detaches upon conviction, when this
second stage ends”).
48. Id. at 1613 n.2; see id. at 1618 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the question
remained open).
49. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 19, § 26.4(f) (“Such a determination is part of the ‘trial’
that must precede the defendant’s conviction for the offense carrying the higher sentencing range;
it is not part of sentencing for that conviction.”). Some criminal statutes provide that if certain
facts are proved, the minimum or maximum sentence (or both) for that crime increases. See id.
§ 26.4(i). In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny, the Court evaluated the
limits on the legislature’s “ability to characterize certain facts as mere sentence factors rather than
as elements of separate, aggravated offenses,” ultimately requiring that facts raising the
sentencing range (besides a prior conviction) be treated as elements of a greater offense. LAFAVE
ET AL., supra note 19, § 26.4(i); see Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016); Alleyne v. United States,
570 U.S. 99 (2013); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523
U.S. 224 (1998). Some trials with Apprendi facts are bifurcated into separate proceedings—one for
the elements of the underlying crime and one for the Apprendi facts that determine the defendant’s
sentencing range. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 19, § 26.4(i); see Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1613 n.2
(referring to bifurcated proceedings where, “at the sentencing stage, facts that could increase the
prescribed sentencing range are determined”). For example, Justice Ginsburg highlighted capital
cases, where a defendant is only eligible for the death penalty if certain aggravating factors are
found beyond a reasonable doubt. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1613 n.2; see LAFAVE ET AL., supra
note 19, § 26.4(i) (explaining that any fact that raises the sentencing range is required to be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt).
50. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 19, § 26.4(i); see Hurst, 136 S. Ct. 616; Alleyne, 570 U.S. 99;
Ring, 536 U.S. 584; Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466; Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224.
51. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 19, § 26.4(h) (explaining that the Court has accepted the
lower preponderance of evidence standard of proof in sentencing proceedings, but when “a fact
functions as an element of an aggravated offense, then the defendant has the right to demand
proof of its existence beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury”).
52. See id. § 26.5(a) (describing the leniency of the evidentiary standard for sentencing
hearings and acknowledging that the “[t]he sentencing court can consider other types of hearsay,
whether contained in the presentence report or offered by the prosecution or defense”).
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proven just by virtue of inclusion in the presentence report.53 It made
sense for the Betterman Court to distinguish bifurcated proceedings in
which facts raising the sentencing range are found—there is a
convincing argument for applying the Speedy Trial Clause to such
proceedings.54 Thus, when this Note hereinafter refers to sentencing
delay or speedy sentencing claims, it refers to sentencing after
conviction and excludes those unique bifurcated proceedings in which
sentence-raising facts are found.
B. Causes and Effects of Delay
Both Lovasco and Barker contemplate the reasons for delay and
the resulting prejudice suffered by the defendant.55 Under both
frameworks, legitimate, nonprejudicial reasons for delay weigh in favor
of the government—that is, denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss
the charge.56 Reasons for delay that are generally found to be
nonprejudicial include preparing the presentence report, calculating
restitution, and conducting discovery concerning these tasks.57 If the
defendant contributes to the delay—by requesting discovery to
challenge the restitution, for example—the court may be less
sympathetic to claims of undue delay.58 Conversely, understaffed
government pretrial teams, full dockets, and strained judicial resources
do not serve as valid reasons for delay.59 If these factors are present,

53. See id. § 26.4(i) (“[A] fact is not admitted merely because the defendant fails to object to
its allegation in a presentence report.”).
54. See id. § 26.4(f) (“There is strong basis for applying the Speedy Trial Clause to a
determination of a fact that must be treated as an element under the Apprendi line of cases.”).
55. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977) (“[P]roof of prejudice is generally
a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim, and . . . the due process inquiry must
consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused.”); Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (“Though some might express them in different ways, we identify four such
factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant.”).
56. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 (describing reasons for delay that should be weighed against the
government and those that might justify delay).
57. See, e.g., United States v. James, 712 F. App’x 154, 162–63 (3d Cir. 2017) (declining to
find undue delay when the probation office spent eight months preparing an extensive presentence
report and calculating restitution and defendants subsequently made discovery motions regarding
the loss calculation for restitution).
58. See, e.g., id. (finding no prejudice when defendants’ numerous discovery motions
contributed to the delay and resulted in a reduction of the restitution calculation).
59. See Burkett v. Fulcomer (Burkett II), 951 F.2d 1431, 1433 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding
violations of due process and the Sixth Amendment caused by “saturated dockets and the apparent
strain on judicial resources” in the state court system); see also James, 712 F. App’x at 162
(weighing “a crowded docket” and “court congestion” against the government).
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however, they merely weigh against the government; they do not
mandate a finding for the defendant.60
Postconviction delay may negatively impact both the defendant
and any victims.61 Sentencing generally provides closure and
punishment following conviction, while delay prolongs resolution for
both the victim and the defendant.62 For the defendant, particularly,
this uncertainty can provoke anxiety or depression and accompanying
physical ailments.63 For example, defendants have complained that
they were unable to eat or sleep during delay, that their significant
others ended their relationships due to the uncertainty of defendants’
ultimate incarceration, and that family members suffered ill effects as
a result of delay.64
Moreover, sentencing delay may keep defendants from
participating in rehabilitative programs available at long-term
correctional facilities,65 as defendants are generally held prior to
sentencing in local jails with few services.66 The Court in Barker
described local jails as “deplorable” and asserted that “[l]engthy
exposure to these conditions ‘has a destructive effect on human
character and makes the rehabilitation of the individual offender much
more difficult.’ ”67 For example, defendants are often unable to access
drug or alcohol treatment, sex offender programs, and educational
programs.68 Because some defendants awaiting sentencing have
already been sentenced for other crimes, they may be unable to timely
60. See James, 712 F. App’x at 162 (noting these factors “weighed against” the government).
61. See 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & SARAH N. WELLING, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 524 (4th ed. 2011 & Supp. 2018) (“Delay in sentencing may leave the defendant, as well as the
victim, in limbo concerning the consequences of conviction.”).
62. See id. (discussing various consequences of sentencing delays).
63. See Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1443–44 (finding that uncontested evidence of Burkett’s
anxiety and its effect on his wellbeing leaned slightly in Burkett’s favor in his claim of delay);
Betterman I, 342 P.3d 971, 973–74 (Mont. 2015) (describing Betterman’s claims that he suffered
from anxiety, depression, and accompanying physical ailments, such as stomach problems, while
awaiting sentencing).
64. See, e.g., Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1443–44 (describing Burkett’s inability to eat or sleep
and noting his claim that his fiancée broke off their engagement due to the uncertainty of the
length of Burkett’s incarceration); United States v. Zamichieli, No. 12-182, 2016 WL 3519550, at
*10 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2016) (reporting defendant’s contention that he suffered from anxiety, that
his fiancée left due to his indeterminate sentence, and that his mother fell ill as a result of the
uncertain delay).
65. See WRIGHT & WELLING, supra note 61, § 524 (“It postpones the commitment of the
defendant to corrections facilities, [and] may have a detrimental effect on rehabilitation . . . .”).
66. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 3–7 (describing Betterman’s fourteen-month
stint in county jail and the detrimental effects it caused).
67. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 520 (1972).
68. See, e.g., Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1443 (restating Burkett’s claims that he had no access to
alcohol and sex offender programs); Betterman I, 342 P.3d at 973–74 (detailing how Betterman
had no access to a mental-health assessment, counseling for chemical dependency, or education).
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complete required programs under their first sentences, further
compounding their problems.69 Finally, several defendants have
pointed out that being held in jail precludes them from becoming
potentially eligible for conditional release or expanded visitation
privileges that correctional facilities may allow.70
Delayed sentencing may also interrupt the rehabilitation of
defendants out on bail during the period between their conviction and
sentence.71 For example, one defendant was inadvertently not
sentenced for fifteen years.72 In the interim, she had built a life for
herself with a family and a job and had rehabilitated on her own.73 Her
ultimate sentence, six months in a halfway house, threatened to set
back her progress.74
From a procedural standpoint, a delay in sentencing may also
delay a defendant’s ability to appeal his sentence. Under the final
judgment rule, an appeal generally cannot be filed until final judgment
has issued.75 In a criminal case, the sentence represents the final
judgment.76 As one defendant protested, the more time that passed
before his sentence, the more difficult it would be to reconstruct his
defense if needed after his appeal was decided.77
Society also suffers costs of delay, as the Barker Court pointed
out.78 First, failure to provide prompt sentencing is inefficient, as it
creates a backlog in the court system.79 A crowded docket will inevitably
lead publicly funded court staff, prosecutors, and public defenders to
remain involved in cases for longer than otherwise necessary and to
69. See, e.g., Betterman I, 342 P.3d at 973 (describing Betterman’s complaints that a warrant
had issued in another county because his sentencing delay inhibited him from completing portions
of the sentence imposed by the other county).
70. See, e.g., Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1443 (crediting defendant’s argument that he would have
had more liberal visitation rights in state prison than he had in county jail); Betterman I, 342 P.3d
at 973 (noting defendant’s argument that he would have been eligible for conditional release if he
was an inmate at the state Department of Corrections instead of the county jail).
71. See United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 2009) (describing a defendant who
had been going about her life, unaware that her sentence was even pending).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 201–02 (asserting that the defendant had been a successful, law-abiding citizen
in the intervening fifteen years and that six months in a halfway house would destabilize her
successful rehabilitation).
75. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324–25 (1940) (establishing the final
judgment rule).
76. See Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937) (“Final judgment in a criminal
case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment.”).
77. Burkett II, 951 F.2d 1431, 1446 (3d Cir. 1991).
78. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519–20 (1972) (listing concerns). Of course, Barker
addresses preconviction delays, but many of its interests are applicable to the postconvictionpresentence context as well. See infra Section III.A.1.
79. Barker, 407 U.S. at 519.
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waste resources squabbling over scheduling.80 Additionally, it burdens
local jail systems, as defendants awaiting sentencing crowd these
facilities.81 As discussed above, delay also prevents defendants’ access
to certain programs and services in corrective facilities that may not be
available in local jails.82 Delaying access to these programs thwarts
defendants’ rehabilitation,83 making it difficult for defendants to
ultimately rejoin and contribute to society.
Two points are clear from this exploration of the causes and
effects of delay. First, there are both legitimate and nonlegitimate
reasons for delay.84 Second, real harm can result from the failure to
sentence a defendant promptly.85 Both society and, of course, the
defendant may suffer as a result of this delay.
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE: CLAIMS OF DELAYED SENTENCING
BEFORE AND AFTER BETTERMAN
Before the Supreme Court’s holding in Betterman, lower federal
and state courts disagreed over how to analyze delay between
conviction and sentencing.86 One view, which Betterman argued for,
was that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial extended to
sentencing.87 Other courts disagreed, taking the position—ultimately
adopted by the Supreme Court in Betterman—that the speedy trial
right terminates upon conviction.88 Courts that rejected a
postconviction speedy trial right generally still allowed defendants to
80. See, e.g., United States v. Cain, 734 F. App’x 21, 25 (2d Cir. 2018) (describing the district
court’s failure to promptly schedule sentencing and admonishing the government that it has a
responsibility remind the court of “the unfinished business before it” in such lapses).
81. Barker, 407 U.S. at 520.
82. See Betterman I, 342 P.3d 971, 973, 977 (Mont. 2015) (noting Betterman was prevented
from entering the correctional facility and unable to attend chemical-dependency counseling or a
sex offender program that he was required to complete for a sentence in another county).
83. Barker, 407 U.S. at 520.
84. Compare United States v. James, 712 F. App’x 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding that an
extensive presentence report was justifiable), with Burkett II, 951 F.2d 1431, 1440 (3d Cir. 1991)
(“[T]he delay caused by the backlog of cases in Blair County cannot be classified as justifiable.”).
85. See, e.g., Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1443–44 (describing Burkett’s extreme anxiety awaiting
sentencing, his inability to obtain rehabilitative services, and the loss of his fiancée due to the
uncertainty of his sentence).
86. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1613 (2016) (“We granted certiorari to resolve a split
among courts over whether the Speedy Trial Clause applies to such delay.” (citation omitted)).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 577 F.2d 269, 270 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (“The
constitutionally guaranteed right to speedy trial applies to sentencing.” (citing Pollard v. United
States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957))).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 198–99 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[I]t is apparent that
sentencing proceedings and trials are separate and distinct phases of criminal prosecutions.
Accordingly, we hold that the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which governs the
timing of trials, does not apply to sentencing proceedings.”).
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pursue a constitutional claim under the Due Process Clause,89 an
approach the Betterman Court endorsed in dicta.90 By explicitly
rejecting the contention that the Speedy Trial Clause applies to
sentencing, the Supreme Court in Betterman resolved the controversy
in one sense.91 Under Betterman’s limited holding, however, open
questions remain: What analytical framework is appropriate to address
constitutional claims of inordinate delay in sentencing?92 And if a court
finds that sentencing was unduly delayed, what is the proper relief?93
Justice Sotomayor explicitly advocated94 for analyzing
sentencing delay under Barker, which established four factors to
consider in analyzing Speedy Trial Clause violations.95 Lower courts,
however, traditionally applied the Lovasco96 test to Due Process Clause
claims of delay in the sentencing context, even though Lovasco
concerned precharge delays.97 After Betterman, courts have split over
whether to apply Barker or Lovasco in speedy sentencing claims under
the Due Process Clause.98 To lay the foundation for this Note’s proposal,
this Part examines the conflicting pre-Betterman approaches, the
rationale of Betterman itself, and post-Betterman approaches. Lastly,
this Part explores the various remedies that have been previously
employed.

89. See, e.g., id. at 199 (“A delay in criminal proceedings that ‘violates those fundamental
conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions, and which define
the community’s sense of fair play and decency,’ can, depending on the circumstances, constitute
a violation of the Due Process Clause.” (quoting United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790
(1977))).
90. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1617–18 (asserting that defendants are not without a
remedy and could seek relief under the Due Process Clause).
91. See id. at 1613 (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial detaches after
conviction).
92. See id. at 1618 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“We have never decided whether the Due Process
Clause creates an entitlement to a reasonably prompt sentencing hearing. Today’s opinion leaves
us free to decide the proper analytical framework to analyze such claims if and when the issue is
properly before us.”); see also id. at 1619 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting the question of the
“appropriate test for such a Due Process Clause challenge . . . is an open one”).
93. See supra note 13.
94. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1619 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (explicitly proposing
Barker factors); see also id. at 1618 n.12 (majority opinion) (listing the Barker factors without
explicitly naming the case).
95. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
96. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
97. See United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 199 (2d Cir. 2009) (applying Lovasco to sentencing
delay but acknowledging it was developed for the precharge context).
98. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 19, § 26.4(f) n.135.80 (noting that some courts following
Betterman have employed the Barker factors while others have used Lovasco).
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A. Pre-Betterman Approaches to Postconviction Delay
Prior to Betterman, the Supreme Court only briefly addressed
whether the sentencing phase of a trial could be examined under the
Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause. In the 1957 case Pollard v.
United States, the Court simply stated: “We will assume arguendo that
sentence is part of the trial for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.”99
Subsequently, many courts—including the U.S. Courts of Appeals for
the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits and at least
seventeen state courts—explicitly held that the Sixth Amendment
applied to delays between conviction and sentencing.100 Other courts,
like the Pollard Court, avoided the question altogether—the First,
Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits and many states
simply assumed that the Speedy Trial Clause applied to speedy
sentencing claims but denied that undue delay had occurred in the
cases before them.101 The Second Circuit and some states—including
Montana102—disagreed, holding that the Speedy Trial Clause did not
apply but that the Due Process Clause provided constitutional
protection against delay.103 Finally, some courts that applied the
Speedy Trial Clause also held that the Due Process Clause applied.104
1. The Speedy Trial Clause and the Barker Factors
Courts holding that the Speedy Trial Clause applied to
sentencing delays regularly applied the Barker balancing test,105 which
99. 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957).
100. See Kristin Saetveit, Note, Beyond Pollard: Applying the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial
Right to Sentencing, 68 STAN. L. REV. 481, 491–93 (2016) (collecting cases applying the Speedy
Trial Clause to sentencing proceedings); see also Jolly v. State, 189 S.W.3d 40, 44 (Ark. 2004)
(noting that seventeen states recognized a speedy trial right to sentencing delays and collecting
state cases), abrogated by Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016).
101. See Saetveit, supra note 100, at 493–94 (collecting cases).
102. See Betterman I, 342 P.3d 971, 978 (Mont. 2015) (rejecting application of the Speedy Trial
Clause).
103. See Saetveit, supra note 100, at 489–90, 494–95 (describing and collecting cases rejecting
the Speedy Trial Clause in the sentencing context and noting that “[s]ome, but not all, of the courts
prohibiting application of the speedy trial right to sentencing have instead located a right to
prompt sentencing under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments”).
104. See id. at 495 n.101 (describing how some courts have analyzed delay under both
constitutional provisions).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Danner, 429 F. App’x 915, 917–18 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that
the Speedy Trial Clause applied to postconviction claims of delay and applying the Barker factors
to a claim of delayed sentencing); United States v. Yehling, 456 F.3d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 2006)
(holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial applies from arrest through sentencing
and applying the Barker factors to defendant’s claim of postconviction delay); United States v.
Sanders, 452 F.3d 572, 577 (6th Cir. 2006) (acknowledging that for Sixth Amendment claims of
delay between trial and sentencing, “the majority of circuits, including this one,” use the Barker
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considers four factors: (1) length of delay, (2) reason for delay,
(3) defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the
defendant.106 Specifically, Barker sought to address prejudice caused by
“oppressive pretrial incarceration,” “anxiety and concern of the
accused,” and fading memories or lost exculpatory evidence that could
possibly weaken the defendant’s case.107 The defendant is not required
to affirmatively prove actual prejudice to his case—the mere possibility
is enough.108 Moreover, Barker’s factors are relatively flexible and
should be considered with the particular facts and circumstances of
each case.109 Courts applying these factors may also take note of the
underlying concerns at play in Barker: decency and fairness; the
societal interest in prompt and efficient adjudication; the potential for
the defendant to commit other crimes or jump bail if he is not confined
between conviction and sentencing; and any “detrimental effect on
rehabilitation.”110
While Barker involved delay between the defendant’s arrest and
trial,111 some courts applied the Barker factors in the sentencing context
as well.112 For example, in Burkett v. Cunningham, the Third Circuit
held that the Speedy Trial Clause applied to the five-and-a-half-year
postconviction delay before Wayne Burkett’s sentencing, and it

test, though declining to apply Barker to a similar claim under the Due Process Clause); United
States v. Thomas, 167 F.3d 299, 303 (6th Cir. 1999) (applying the Sixth Amendment to claims of
delayed resentencing and using the Barker factors); United States v. Abou-Kassem, 78 F.3d 161,
167 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that the “constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy trial applies to
sentencing” and that “[w]e review sentencing delays under Barker v. Wingo”); Burkett I, 826 F.2d
1208, 1220 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding explicitly that the Speedy Trial Clause applies through the
sentencing phase and that the Barker factors should be applied to analyze the claim); Jolly, 189
S.W.3d at 45 (“[W]e conclude that the right to a speedy sentence is encompassed within the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial. We therefore turn to an application of the factors enunciated
in Barker v. Wingo . . . to determine whether Jolly was denied his right to a speedy sentencing in
this case.” (footnote omitted)).
106. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
107. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 654 (1992) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).
108. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 (identifying an interest in limiting “the possibility” of an
impaired defense and noting that “[l]oss of memory . . . is not always reflected in the record because
what has been forgotten can rarely be shown”).
109. See Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 254 (10th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he factors set forth in Barker
are guidelines, not rigid tests. . . . [A]ll four factors are to be balanced in light of the facts and
circumstances of the case.”).
110. Barker, 407 U.S. at 519–20.
111. See id. at 533 (describing the right to a speedy trial and detriments resulting from delay
between arrest and trial, which was extraordinary in Barker’s case). Barker waited over five years
after his arrest for his murder trial to begin—the prosecution wanted to convict the other suspect
accused of the murder first, then obtain his testimony against Barker. Id. at 516–19.
112. See cases cited infra notes 168–169.
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considered his claim under Barker.113 The court implied that Barker
provided an appropriate analysis of the circumstances causing delay,
which was necessary to determine if the delay in Burkett’s case was
undue.114 Ultimately, the Third Circuit held that the trial court acted
within its discretion in finding that all Barker factors weighed in favor
of Burkett.115 The court emphasized the length of the delay (over five
years) and its detrimental effect on Burkett, who suffered anxiety as a
result of his indeterminate sentencing.116 In fashioning relief for
Burkett, the court noted that the “normal remedy” for a Speedy Trial
Clause violation is dismissal,117 and in light of the egregiousness of the
violation, “no remedy short of discharge can vindicate Burkett’s right to
speedy trial.”118 Accordingly, the Third Circuit ordered the lower court
to discharge Burkett’s convictions.119
2. The Due Process Clause and the Lovasco Test
In the pre-Betterman era, some courts declined to apply the
Speedy Trial Clause to sentencing but found that due process provided
defendants with an avenue for constitutional relief.120 These courts
applied the Lovasco121 test to determine whether defendants’ due
process rights were violated.122 Lovasco requires that courts consider
both (1) the reason for the delay and (2) the prejudice to the accused.123
113. See Burkett I, 826 F.2d 1208, 1211, 1220, 1223–24 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that the Speedy
Trial Clause applies to sentencing and that Burkett’s claim of undue sentencing delay could be
properly considered under Barker).
114. See id. at 1219 (describing the application of Barker). But see Saetveit, supra note 100, at
491 (suggesting that the Burkett court’s reasoning for accepting the Speedy Trial Clause in this
context was sparse).
115. Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1224.
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973)); see also Strunk, 412 U.S. at
440 (holding that for a Speedy Trial Clause violation, “dismissal must remain, as Barker noted,
‘the only possible remedy’ ” (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972))).
118. Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1224–25.
119. Id. at 1226.
120. See, e.g., United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 199 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the Speedy
Trial Clause did not apply to sentencing but explaining that the Due Process Clause could protect
defendant against undue delay); Betterman I, 342 P.3d 971, 978 (Mont. 2015) (rejecting application
of the Speedy Trial Clause to sentencing delay but holding that Betterman’s “interest in being
sentenced without unreasonable delay is ‘protected primarily by the Due Process Clause’ ” (quoting
United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982))).
121. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
122. See, e.g., Ray, 578 F.3d at 199 (holding Lovasco is the appropriate standard to analyze
due process violations at the sentencing phase); Betterman I, 342 P.3d at 979 (same).
123. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790; see id. (“[P]roof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not
sufficient element of a due process claim.”); see also Ray, 578 F.3d at 199 (noting that prejudice
alone is not enough to examine due process and that the reason for the delay must be balanced
against the prejudice imposed).
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Lower courts have interpreted the first prong of Lovasco to require proof
that the government delayed in bad faith, even if the defendant can
show some prejudice.124 Under the second prong of this test, speculative
claims of prejudice are not enough—the defendant must demonstrate
actual prejudice.125
Although the Lovasco test was originally conceived to analyze
suspects’ due process rights against delay before arrest or charge, some
courts found it applied to the posttrial context as well.126 United States
v. Ray exemplifies the application of Lovasco to a Due Process Clause
claim for speedy sentencing.127 In late 1991, Shenna Ray pleaded guilty
to conspiracy to commit mail fraud, but she was not ultimately
sentenced until early 2008, over sixteen years later.128 After her plea,
Ray was originally sentenced to one year of incarceration, which she
appealed.129 While her appeal was pending, the Second Circuit issued a
separate decision that required reexamination of Ray’s sentence, so the
case was remanded to the district court.130 The court, however,
inadvertently failed to reschedule Ray’s sentencing.131 Ray, who had
been released on bail pending her appeal, assumed the matter was
settled and moved on—she started a family, worked, attended school,
and paid taxes.132 Sixteen years later, the court discovered the issue and
scheduled Ray to be sentenced.133 Acknowledging that the long delay
was troubling and commending Ray’s considerable rehabilitation, the
government recommended that she be sentenced to probation and home
detention.134 Instead, the court sentenced Ray to one day in prison and

124. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 452 F.3d 572, 581 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding no due
process violation under Lovasco when defendant did not provide affirmative evidence of bad faith
by the government).
125. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325–26 (1971) (explaining that the defendants
did not demonstrate actual prejudice and that the due process claims are thus “speculative and
premature”); Betterman I, 342 P.3d at 980–81 (rejecting Betterman’s due process claim as
“speculative” and concluding that Betterman’s prejudice was “not substantial and demonstrable,”
even though it involved unacceptable institutional delay).
126. Sanders, 452 F.3d at 580; see also Ray, 578 F.3d at 199 (noting that although Lovasco
pertains to pretrial delay, it is “equally applicable” to sentencing).
127. See Ray, 578 F.3d at 199–202 (explaining the rationale for using Lovasco and applying
the same to the case).
128. Id. at 186–87.
129. Id. at 187.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 187–88 (describing how Ray sought documentation of her criminal record from
the court and that it became apparent that she was never resentenced and never served her
original sentence).
134. See id. at 188–89 (explaining that the government took responsibility for the delay and
recommended defense counsel’s proposed sentence).
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three years of supervised release, with the first six months in a halfway
house.135 This last provision was most troublesome, because it
prevented Ray from working and caring for her youngest child.136 Ray
appealed under the Speedy Trial Clause and the Due Process Clause,
seeking to have her conviction vacated and sentence dismissed.137
The Second Circuit rejected her speedy trial claim, taking issue
with the fact that a Speedy Trial Clause violation requires dismissal of
all charges.138 The court reasoned that long postconviction delays do not
invoke the same anxiety as preconviction delays, nor do postconviction
delays affect the defendant’s ability to defend herself.139 Nevertheless,
the Second Circuit concluded, the Due Process Clause provides some
protection against “oppressive delay” in sentencing, noting such delays
violate due process notions of fairness and decency.140 The court found
that Lovasco offered an appropriate analysis, because the primary
consideration after conviction—similar to precharge—is oppressive
delay.141 The court reasoned that considerations of prejudice and
nonlegitimate reasons for delay must each be evaluated “in light of each
other and the surrounding circumstances,” such that even substantial
prejudice could be outweighed by a legitimate reason for the delay.142
Ultimately, the court found that the government’s negligence
caused the delay and that Ray did not have a duty to seek out
sentencing.143 Moreover, the prejudice to Ray would be significant, as
time in a halfway house would disrupt her successful rehabilitation. 144
The court explained that an appropriate remedy would instead
counteract any prejudice caused by the violation of Ray’s rights.145
Accordingly, it suspended the remainder of her sentence but

135. Id. at 189.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 186.
138. See id. at 193–94, 199 (noting that dismissal, as mandated by Strunk, was an inapposite
remedy and denying that the Speedy Trial Clause applied).
139. See Saetveit, supra note 100, at 490 (summarizing the Ray court’s lengthy reasoning,
including the theory that the anxiety that defendants suffer from public accusation before trial is
unlike the postconviction experience).
140. Ray, 578 F.3d at 199.
141. See id. (“The directive set forth in Rule 32, taken together with the general prohibition of
‘oppressive delay’ established by the Due Process Clause, protects criminal defendants from
unreasonable delays between conviction and sentencing.” (citation omitted) (quoting United States
v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977))).
142. Id. at 199–200.
143. See id. at 200 (noting that the government acknowledged its responsibility for the delay
and that so long as Ray sought to have her sentence reconsidered rather than vacated, she did not
bear responsibility for seeking out sentencing).
144. Id. at 201–02.
145. Id. at 202.
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emphasized that not every sentencing delay would necessarily warrant
such drastic relief.146
Betterman did not fare so well when the Montana Supreme
Court similarly rejected his Speedy Trial Clause claim but considered
his claim of delay under the Due Process Clause.147 The court explained
that, as to the Due Process Clause claim, both the reason and prejudice
prongs of Lovasco were necessary to establish a violation: even if a
defendant demonstrated “actual and substantial prejudice,” no remedy
was warranted if there was a “legitimate reason” for the delay.148 The
court attributed the majority of the fourteen-month sentencing delay to
the state, because preparing the presentence report and scheduling the
sentencing hearing took “an inordinate amount of time” through no
fault of Betterman’s.149 Nevertheless, the court rejected Betterman’s
claim—even after noting Betterman suffered an “unacceptable delay”—
because his claims of prejudice were too “speculative.”150
3. Dual Application of the Speedy Trial Clause and
the Due Process Clause
Some courts have held that both the Speedy Trial Clause and
the Due Process Clause are applicable to sentencing delay; these courts
have proceeded to conflate the analyses for the two clauses.151 For
example, in Burkett, the Third Circuit held that the Speedy Trial Clause
applied to Burkett’s five-and-a-half-year sentencing delay.152
Additionally, the court asserted that the Due Process Clause applied to
any delay attendant to conviction, including sentencing delays.153
Interestingly, the court analyzed the potential Due Process Clause and
Speedy Trial Clause violations together,154 asserting that both clauses
constrained postverdict delay and that the Barker factors should

146. Id.
147. Betterman I, 342 P.3d 971, 978 (Mont. 2015).
148. Id. at 979 (quoting United States v. L’Allier, 838 F.2d 234, 238 (7th Cir. 1988)).
149. Id. at 980.
150. See id. at 980–81 (finding Betterman’s anticipated access to Department of Corrections
rehabilitative services was too speculative).
151. Saetveit, supra note 100, at 495 n.101; see Burkett I, 826 F.2d 1208, 1221–22 (3d Cir.
1987) (asserting that the Due Process and Speedy Trial Clauses both “constrain post-verdict delay”
and using the Barker factors to “inform” the due process analysis).
152. Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1220.
153. See id. at 1221 (“The Due Process clause . . . protects not only against delays in trial,
including sentencing; it also guarantees a reasonably speedy appeal . . . .”). In Burkett, the court
was particularly concerned that the delay in sentencing had hindered Burkett’s ability to seek
appeal. See id. at 1225 (“Burkett has been prejudiced by the monumental delay he has encountered
in his attempts to secure his appeal as of right.”).
154. Id. at 1222.
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“inform [the] due process determination.”155 Of course, the analysis for
Speedy Trial Clause and Due Process Clause violations are not wholly
dissimilar. Indeed, the Barker and Lovasco tests both consider the
reason for delay and prejudice to the defendant.156
B. Post-Betterman Approaches to Postconviction Delay
In 2015, the Betterman Court definitively held that the Sixth
Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause was inapplicable to sentencing
delays.157 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, reasoned that
protection under the Speedy Trial Clause only applies before the
defendant is convicted or pleads guilty and is thus still presumed
innocent.158 She pointed to the history and text of the Speedy Trial
Clause as support: the Sixth Amendment refers only to the “accused,”
who were traditionally treated differently than those already tried and
convicted.159 In dicta, the Court suggested that the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments could still provide relief to
defendants complaining of undue delay between conviction and
sentencing.160 But Justice Ginsburg did not apply this analysis, as the
petitioner did not pursue a due process claim before the Court.161
In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor emphasized that the
question of the “appropriate test for such a Due Process Clause
challenge . . . is an open one.”162 Nevertheless, Justice Sotomayor
proposed that the Barker factors, though traditionally used to analyze
Speedy Trial Clause violations, could provide the proper framework for
a due process analysis.163 Moreover, while Justice Ginsburg asserted
that the “primary safeguard comes from statutes and rules,”164 she
suggested that courts analyzing a constitutional claim of sentencing

155. See id. (explaining that sentencing served as a gatekeeping function to seeking an appeal
and thus implicated Burkett’s due process rights by delaying his ability to appeal); see also
Saetveit, supra note 100, at 495 n.101 (stating that Burkett conflates the two standards).
156. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977) (focusing on prejudice to defendant
and reason for delay); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (considering the length of the
delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant).
157. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2016).
158. Id. at 1614.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1612.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1619 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
163. Id.
164. See id. at 1617 & n.10 (majority opinion) (referencing Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
32(b)(1) and collecting examples of state provisions similar to the federal rule); see also FED. R.
CRIM. P. 32(b)(1) (“The court must impose sentence without unnecessary delay.”).
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delay could consider the “length of and reasons for delay, the
defendant’s diligence in requesting expeditious sentencing, and
prejudice.”165 These are the same four Barker factors that Justice
Sotomayor proposed, but Justice Ginsburg did not cite Barker or
explicitly endorse its application.166
While Betterman did not explicitly recognize a constitutional
right to speedy sentencing, courts have been cognizant of Betterman’s
dicta regarding the application of the Due Process Clause.167 To date,
only the Second and Third Circuits have ruled on a defendant’s
constitutional right to speedy sentencing following Betterman. Both
courts analyzed the defendants’ claims under the Due Process Clause,
but they disagreed on whether to apply Barker or Lovasco.168 Federal
district courts and state courts have also failed to agree on the
appropriate speedy sentencing analysis.169 Generally, they have

165. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1617–18, 1618 n.12.
166. Rory Little, Opinion Analysis: “Speedy Trial” Guarantee Does Not Apply to Sentencing,
SCOTUSBLOG (May 19, 2016, 8:30 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/05/opinion-analysisspeedy-trial-guarantee-does-not-apply-to-sentencing [https://perma.cc/7NJ5-KQNN].
167. See Neathery v. Rader, No. 13-658-BAJ-RLB, 2016 WL 8313923, at *6 (M.D. La. Dec. 30,
2016) (“There is no precedent from the United States Supreme Court specifically holding that the
Constitution guarantees a right to speedy sentencing. . . . Nevertheless, this Court is cognizant of
the Supreme Court’s dicta in Betterman . . . .”).
168. Compare United States v. Cain, 734 F. App’x 21, 24–26 (2d Cir. 2018) (analyzing delay
between appeal and resentencing under the Lovasco factors: reason for delay and prejudice to
accused), and United States v. Brown, 709 F. App’x 103, 103 (2d Cir. 2018) (analyzing delay
between defendant’s guilty plea and sentencing under the Due Process Clause and employing
Lovasco to find no violation), with United States v. James, 712 F. App’x 154, 161–63 (3d Cir. 2017)
(employing the Barker factors to find that a fourteen-month delay between conviction and
sentencing did not violate due process when that time was used for the probation office to
determine the full amount of restitution owed and for the defendant to seek discovery).
169. After Betterman, several courts have used the Barker factors to analyze claims of
sentencing delay. Some have held, implicitly or explicitly, that Barker provides the proper analysis
for postconviction due process claims. See United States v. Phillips, No. 1:15-cr-104, 2017 WL
3129135, at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 24, 2017) (asserting, pursuant to circuit precedent, that “[a]fter a
defendant is found guilty, or a guilty plea has been entered, any alleged undue delays are assessed
under the Barker due process analysis”); Deck v. Steele, 249 F. Supp. 3d 991, 1079–82 (E.D. Mo.
2017) (using the Barker factors as the framework for a due process analysis of petitioner’s claim of
delayed sentencing in his capital case); United States v. Zamichieli, No. 12-182, 2016 WL 3519550,
at *8 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2016) (holding that Barker is the appropriate test to apply to defendant’s
due process claim of unreasonable sentencing delay).
Others have rejected a constitutional right to speedy sentencing or have declined to
characterize defendants’ claims as due process claims yet have nevertheless relied on Barker to
analyze a claim of delayed sentencing. See Arnett v. Paramo, No. EDCV 16-1169-FMO (JPR), 2017
WL 4325576, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2017) (citing Betterman for the proposition that petitioner
had “no constitutional right to a speedy sentencing hearing” but nevertheless citing Barker in
finding that the delay was not prejudicial to the point of violating petitioner’s constitutional rights
in part because he did not object to the continuance of both his trial and sentencing), adopted, No.
EDCV 16-1169-FMO (JPR), 2017 WL 4325586 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2017) (mem.); Li v. State, No.
70100, 2017 WL 1215890, at *2 (Nev. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2017) (relying on the Barker factors without
explicitly mentioning the Due Process Clause to find no speedy sentencing violation).
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utilized some form of a due process analysis but have not agreed on
whether to apply the Barker factors,170 as Justice Sotomayor
recommended.171 In many ways, this divide now mirrors the prior split
between courts applying the Barker factors under the Speedy Trial
Clause and those using a Due Process Clause Lovasco analysis.172

Several courts have relied on the two prongs of the Lovasco test to analyze Due Process Clause
claims of delayed sentencing. See United States v. Evans, No. 15-16 ADM/LIB, 2017 WL 1047254,
at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 17, 2017) (naming reasons for delay and prejudice to the defendant as the
primary considerations for a due process claim); Neathery, 2016 WL 8313923, at *6 (declining to
endorse Justice Sotomayor’s proposal to use Barker to analyze speedy sentencing violations but
considering the reason for defendant’s sentencing delay and any resulting prejudice in finding no
due process violation); State v. Lopez, 410 P.3d 226, 232–33 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017) (asserting that
the Lovasco test is “most suitable” to analyze sentencing delays under the Due Process Clause).
Other courts have either declined to endorse or rejected a specific test but have nevertheless
decided claims of delayed sentencing under the Due Process Clause; these courts generally rely on
notions of fundamental fairness. See Jurado v. Davis, No. 08cv1400 JLS (JMA), 2018 WL 4405418,
at *127 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2018) (asserting that even after Betterman, the California Supreme
Court could decline to apply the Speedy Trial Clause to bifurcated proceedings and holding that
under the Due Process Clause, the capital petitioner failed to prove that sentencing delay caused
the penalty phase of his trial to be “fundamentally unfair”); United States v. Lymon, Nos. 15-CR4302MCA, 15-CR-4082MCA, 2016 WL 9488764, at *3 (D.N.M. Dec. 9, 2016) (relying on Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(b)(1) and a due process right to a fundamentally fair sentencing
proceeding to determine that vacating a sentencing hearing would cause unnecessary and unfair
delay, respectively); Figueroa v. Buechele, No. 15-2972 (CCC), 2016 WL 3457013, at *4 (D.N.J.
June 23, 2016) (applying neither Lovasco nor Barker explicitly but finding defendant’s due process
rights had not been violated, because he was not prejudiced by the delay in his sentencing); People
v. Dalby, No. C078421, 2018 WL 316442, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2018) (noting that
“[d]iminished due process rights arguably protect against fundamental unfairness in sentencing
and resentencing” but implicitly declining to adopt the Barker test, instead simply finding no
prejudice); People v. Wiseman, 413 P.3d 233, 241–42, 242 n.10, 244 (Colo. App. 2017) (explicitly
rejecting the Barker test to analyze delay in sentencing and instead applying a “shock the
conscience” standard to Wiseman’s due process claim regarding delayed resentencing).
Finally, a few courts have simply held that there is no constitutional right to speedy sentencing
under Betterman. See Johnson v. Lester, No. CV-17-90-BU-BMM, 2018 WL 934605, at *1 (D. Mont.
Feb. 16, 2018) (holding that under Betterman, “[n]o due process claim for unreasonable sentencing
delay clearly exists under federal law at this time”); Stevens v. McTighe, No. CV-18-01-BU-BMM,
2018 WL 747846, at *2 (D. Mont. Feb. 7, 2018) (same); State v. D.S., No. 16-0693, 2017 WL
5509925, at *7–8 (W. Va. Nov. 17, 2017) (holding that defendant had no right to a speedy
sentencing hearing under Betterman and that, while sentencing should be imposed without
unreasonable delay, the delay in this case was not oppressive or purposeful).
170. See Lopez, 410 P.3d at 233 (noting that at least one federal district court has adopted the
Barker factors following Betterman while other jurisdictions have adhered to the Lovasco
framework).
171. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1619 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
172. See id. at 1613 n.1 (majority opinion) (collecting cases split on whether Speedy Trial
Clause applied to sentencing); see also, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 452 F.3d 572, 580 (6th Cir.
2006) (rejecting Barker and analyzing undue delay in sentencing under the Lovasco framework for
due process); Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 254 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying the Barker factors to
a Speedy Trial Clause analysis of undue delay in sentencing).
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1. Applying the Barker Factors to Due Process Claims
After Betterman, the Third Circuit has continued to apply the
Barker factors to sentencing, now solely under the Due Process
Clause.173 For example, in United States v. James, two defendants were
convicted of crimes related to their tax fraud scheme.174 After the trial,
the government sought to calculate and prove the total loss stemming
from the defendants’ scheme, which delayed the presentence report.175
One defendant challenged the calculation and sought related discovery,
further postponing the sentencing hearing.176 Attorney scheduling
conflicts and the district judge’s illness caused another two-month
delay.177 Ultimately, the defendants waited fourteen months for
sentencing.178
The Third Circuit noted that Betterman’s holding did not
preclude the application of the Barker test to due process claims, which
was consistent with circuit precedent.179 As discussed in Section II.A.3,
the Third Circuit had previously justified applying Barker to due
process claims on the basis that both the Speedy Trial and Due Process
Clauses protect defendants against undue postconviction delay.180
Thus, it reasoned, the Clauses could be analyzed under the same test.181
In James, the Third Circuit acknowledged that it might need to revisit
its speedy sentencing jurisprudence in light of Betterman.182
Nevertheless, the court declined to set out a new standard and instead
applied the Barker factors to the defendants’ Due Process Clause
claims.183
Ultimately, the Third Circuit denied the defendants’ speedy
sentencing claim under a Barker due process analysis.184 The court
acknowledged that fourteen months was an undesirably long wait

173. See James, 712 F. App’x at 161–62 (employing the Barker factors to analyze a due process
claim regarding a sentencing delay).
174. Id. at 156–57.
175. Id. at 156.
176. Id. at 156–57, 162.
177. Id. at 162.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 161–62 (citing Burkett I, 826 F.2d 1208, 1219–21 (3d Cir. 1987)) (noting that
Burkett had previously addressed claims of undue delay in sentencing under both the Speedy Trial
Clause, now precluded in this context, and the Due Process Clause).
180. See Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1222 (“Because both the Due Process and Speedy Trial clauses
constrain post-verdict delay, the Fifth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit have looked to the four Barker
factors as a means of determining whether due process has been violated.”).
181. See id. (“[T]he Barker factors should also inform our due process determination.”).
182. James, 712 F. App’x at 161–62.
183. Id. at 162.
184. Id. at 163.
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under Barker’s first factor.185 But it found that the reasons for delay—
Barker’s second factor—were nondeliberate and justified, as the delay
was attributable to defendants’ discovery requests, the complexity of
calculating restitution, the judge’s illness, and scheduling conflicts.186
Under Barker’s third factor—assertion of right—the Third Circuit
found that the defendants did not demand their right to speedy
sentencing for over a year.187 Lastly, the court was not convinced that
defendants demonstrated prejudice, Barker’s fourth factor.188 The
defendants asserted that their confinement in a local jail—where they
consumed a poor diet, had no law library, and suffered anxiety—was
prejudicial.189 The James court acknowledged that confinement in a
local jail pending sentencing could be prejudicial but held that this was
not enough, on its own, to tip the scales in the defendants’ favor,
particularly when the defendants received “substantial benefits” from
the delay.190
2. Utilizing the Lovasco Test
Post-Betterman, the Second Circuit has continued to analyze
speedy sentencing claims under the Due Process Clause, applying the
Lovasco test consistent with circuit precedent.191 In United States v.
Cain, the defendant waited five years for sentencing after his case was
remanded to the district court.192 The court described how Cain’s
requests for an attorney and resentencing were ignored, chastising the
government and district court for demonstrating a “dismaying
disregard for Cain’s right to a timely resentencing.”193 But despite
attributing nearly all responsibility for the delay to the government and
district court, the court concluded that Cain could not demonstrate the

185. Id. at 162.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 163.
189. Id.
190. See id. (noting that defendants were able to successfully contest certain restitution
calculations for a reduction).
191. See United States v. Cain, 734 F. App’x 21, 24–25 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing Ray and applying
Lovasco to defendant’s due process claim of delayed sentencing); United States v. Brown, 709 F.
App’x 103, 103 (2d Cir. 2018) (denying, in summary order, defendant’s due process claim under
Ray); United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 199 (2d Cir. 2009) (applying Lovasco to a due process
analysis of delay in sentencing).
192. 734 F. App’x at 25.
193. See id. (asserting that the trial court and the government must not “leave a defendant in
limbo, uncounseled, uncertain whether he will be retried, and without any indication of when, if
ever, his arguments for a more lenient sentence after the dismissal of some of the most serious
charges against him will be heard”).
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necessary prejudice.194 His claims were too “speculative”—for example,
Cain could not assert much more than the possibility of being released
sooner.195
Some district courts and state courts have similarly applied the
Lovasco test to alleged sentencing delays.196 In State v. Lopez, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals found that Lovasco was better suited to
delayed sentencing due process claims than Barker because Barker
might not translate well to the postconviction context.197 The Lopez
court noted that due process is satisfied when a defendant receives
“adequate procedure to redress an improper deprivation of liberty.”198
Lovasco, the court explained, appropriately limits the court’s inquiry to
whether the procedure violated the community’s “fundamental
conceptions of justice which lie at the base of civil and political
institutions, and which define the community’s sense of fair play and
decency.”199 Arguably, the court in Lopez implied that Barker is not well
suited to the due process arena, because Barker considers more than
merely whether appropriate procedural protections were employed.200
The Lopez court emphasized that regardless of the test, the
burden of demonstrating prejudice—a necessary but not sufficient
element of a due process claim—fell on the defendant.201 Ultimately, the
court rejected the defendant’s claim because he did not meet this
burden.202 Although the defendant waited 209 days between his
conviction and sentencing, the reasons for delay included preparation
of the presentence report, the judge’s medical leave, and the defendant’s
request for delay to “get his affairs in order.”203 Because the defendant
did not demonstrate significant prejudice, the court held that vacating
the sentence would result in an unjustified windfall.204

194. Id. at 26.
195. Id.
196. See cases cited supra note 169.
197. State v. Lopez, 410 P.3d 226, 233 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017).
198. See id. (“However, as recognized in Justice Thomas’s concurrence, the Barker factors ‘may
not necessarily translate to the delayed sentencing context.’ Instead, ‘[t]he Due Process Clause can
be satisfied where a [s]tate has adequate procedure to redress an improper deprivation of liberty
or property.’ ” (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609,
1618 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring))).
199. Id. (quoting United States v. Sanders, 452 F.3d 572, 580 (6th Cir. 2006)).
200. See id. (explaining that Barker may not translate well to due process claims, as due
process only requires adequate procedure).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 234 (citing Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2016)).
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C. Remedies for Finding Undue Delay in Sentencing
Courts that find a speedy sentencing violation may impose
various remedies.205 In Burkett, the Third Circuit held that the
egregious five-and-a-half-year delay in Burkett’s sentencing could not
warrant any remedy other than dismissal.206 The court was clear that
Burkett was a unique case with extreme facts: the length of delay was
“monumental” and inexcusable, his right to review on appeal had been
impaired, and the state court had continued to blatantly ignore federal
orders to sentence him promptly—even the assistant district attorney
for the county acknowledged that dismissal was appropriate given the
circumstances.207
Burkett later appealed to the Third Circuit again in a separate
proceeding, complaining of a twenty-nine-month sentencing delay
arising from a trial and conviction unrelated to that discussed above.208
The court acknowledged that he was harmed by the amount of time he
spent in local jails without rehabilitative support and by the anxiety
resulting from the uncertainty about his sentence and isolation from his
family and friends.209 Accordingly, the court reduced Burkett’s sentence
by the amount of time that he had spent in local jail awaiting his
sentencing after conviction (twenty-nine months).210 It distinguished
this case from Burkett’s prior vacated sentence by explaining that in
the previous case, the state court repeatedly flouted federal instructions
to sentence him.211
Other courts have found that suspending the remainder of a
sentence may be appropriate.212 In Ray, for example, the Second Circuit
205. Cf. Brody v. Village of Port Chester, 345 F.3d 103, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that
“[t]he appropriate remedy for a proven due process violation often depends on the stage at which
the violation is found and the relief sought” and noting that damages for a violation that has
already occurred might prompt consideration of how the outcome would have changed with the
required process, but when “injunctive relief is sought, courts simply have ordered the responsible
government entity to provide an opportunity for process going forward”).
206. Burkett I, 826 F.2d 1208, 1226 (3d Cir. 1987).
207. See id. at 1225–26 (“Under the unusual circumstances of this case, including the ongoing
violation of the federal court order and Blair County’s concession as to the appropriate remedy, it
appears that no relief short of discharge could fully remedy these violations.”).
208. Burkett II, 951 F.2d 1431, 1436–37 (3d Cir. 1991); see id. at 1449 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(describing Burkett’s third arrest and set of charges to which this appeal pertained).
209. Id. at 1447 (majority opinion).
210. Id. The defendant in Betterman also suggested a reduction in sentence equivalent to the
delay, but he did not receive such relief. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 n.6 (2016).
211. See Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1447 (“In Burkett I, however, the state court continued to
violate the federal court order that petitioner be sentenced . . . . Here, the relief is more difficult to
fashion.”).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 202–03 (2d Cir. 2009) (suspending the
remainder of Ray’s sentence in light of a sixteen-year delay and her substantial rehabilitation).
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found that vacating the remainder of Ray’s sentence was proper213
because a custodial sentence imposed fifteen years late would threaten
her successful rehabilitation.214 The court recognized, however, that
this circumstance was unusual and that “[t]he normal remedy for a due
process violation is not discharge; rather, a court faced with a violation
should attempt to counteract any resulting prejudice demonstrated by
a petitioner.”215
Lastly, some circuits have fashioned an appropriate sentence in
an ad hoc fashion, with a discretionary reduction that does not
necessarily correspond to the length of the delay.216 For example, the
D.C. Circuit found that several months’ reduction in sentencing and a
judicial apology were sufficient reparations for a thirty-three-month
sentencing delay, during which time the defendant was confined to local
jail.217
In sum, a range of remedies may address undue delay, and
courts have held that the context of the delay is relevant to the
remedy.218 These examples help inform the relevant considerations in
addressing claims of undue delay.
III. AN UNEASY FIT: ORIENTING POSTCONVICTION DELAY
WITHIN PRECONVICTION FRAMEWORKS
After Betterman rejected the application of the Speedy Trial
Clause to claims of delayed sentencing, courts have generally agreed
that defendants’ constitutional due process rights may protect them
from undue sentencing delay.219 The Supreme Court endorsed this
213. Ray was sentenced to one day in prison and three years of supervised relief. Id. at 189.
She served one day in prison before bringing this appeal. Id. at 190.
214. Id. at 202–03.
215. Id. at 202 (quoting Burkett I, 826 F.2d 1208, 1222 (3d Cir. 1987)).
216. See United States v. Yelverton, 197 F.3d 531, 537–39 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (upholding
Yelverton’s remedy for undue delay in sentencing when he received a judicial apology and was
intentionally sentenced in the middle of the guideline range rather than at the top).
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., Ray, 578 F.3d at 202–03 (suspending the remainder of Ray’s sentence because
the delay was fifteen years and she had substantially rehabilitated herself); Yelverton, 197 F.3d at
537–39 (upholding judicial apology and sentence in the middle of the sentencing guideline rather
than at the top when sentencing delay could be attributed to the government but was not done in
bad faith); Burkett II, 951 F.2d 1431, 1447 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a sentence reduction was
appropriate but, unlike Burkett’s prior speedy sentencing claim, a sentence vacatur was not
appropriate, since the lower court had willfully disregarded orders to sentence Burkett in the prior
case).
219. See United States v. Cain, 734 F. App’x 21, 24–25 (2d Cir. 2018) (using Due Process
Clause and Lovasco); United States v. Brown, 709 F. App’x 103, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2018) (using Due
Process Clause and Lovasco); United States v. James, 712 F. App’x 154, 161–62 (3d Cir. 2017)
(using Due Process Clause and Barker); Jurado v. Davis, No. 08cv1400 JLS (JMA), 2018 WL
4405418, at *127 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2018) (using Due Process Clause); United States v. Phillips,
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approach in dicta.220 And lower courts’ application of due process
analyses to alleged speedy sentencing violations, both before and after
Betterman, demonstrates that due process is a workable analysis in the
postconviction phase.221 A split remains, however, over the appropriate
analysis to determine whether due process has been violated. An
evaluation of the benefits and drawbacks of Barker and Lovasco should
consider the behavior that courts are attempting to deter and how the
remedy effectuates that deterrence.
A. Comparing Frameworks to Analyze Undue Delay
Neither Barker nor Lovasco addressed undue delay in
sentencing—Barker involved delay between arrest and trial, while
Lovasco pertained to precharge delay.222 Nevertheless, each test has
features that render it well suited for the sentencing context and
reasons that it might not be appropriate.

No. 1:15-CR-104, 2017 WL 3129135, at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 24, 2017) (using Due Process Clause and
Barker); Deck v. Steele, 249 F. Supp. 3d 991, 1080 (E.D. Mo. 2017) (using Due Process Clause and
Barker); United States v. Evans, No. 15-16 ADM/LIB, 2017 WL 1047254, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 17,
2017) (using Due Process Clause and Lovasco factors, though not by name); Neathery v. Rader,
No. 13-658-BAJ-RLB, 2016 WL 8313923, at *6 (M.D. La. Dec. 30, 2016) (using Due Process Clause
and Lovasco-type analysis); United States v. Lymon, No. 15-CR-4082MCA, 2016 WL 9488764, at
*3 (D.N.M. Dec. 9, 2016) (using Due Process Clause); United States v. Zamichieli, No. 12-182, 2016
WL 3519550, at *7–8 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2016) (using Due Process Clause and Barker); Figueroa v.
Buechele, No. 15-2972 (CCC), 2016 WL 3457013, at *4 (D.N.J. June 23, 2016) (using Due Process
Clause); People v. Dalby, No. C078421, 2018 WL 316442, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2018)
(acknowledging that the Due Process Clause “arguably protect[s] against fundamental unfairness
in sentencing”); People v. Wiseman, 413 P.3d 233, 241–42, 242 n.10 (Colo. App. 2017) (using Due
Process Clause but rejecting Barker); State v. Lopez, 410 P.3d 226, 233 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017) (using
Due Process Clause and Lovasco). But see Johnson v. Lester, No. CV-17-90-BU-BMM, 2018 WL
934605, at *1 (D. Mont. Feb. 16, 2018) (holding there is no federal due process claim for
unreasonable sentencing delay); Stevens v. McTighe, No. CV-18-01-BU-BMM, 2018 WL 747846,
at *2 (D. Mont. Feb. 7, 2018) (same); Arnett v. Paramo, No. EDCV 16-1169-FMO (JPR), 2017 WL
4325576, at *18–19 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2017) (asserting that defendant has “no constitutional right
to a speedy sentencing hearing” but analyzing the claim under state law limiting sentencing delay),
adopted, No. EDCV 16-1169-FMO (JPR), 2017 WL 4325586 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2017) (mem.);
State v. D.S., No. 16-0693, 2017 WL 5509925, at *7–8 (W. Va. Nov. 17, 2017) (holding that
defendant has no right to a speedy sentencing hearing under Betterman but that sentencing should
be imposed without unreasonable delay).
220. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2016) (suggesting that a defendant could seek
relief under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
221. See, e.g., Brown, 709 F. App’x at 103 (acknowledging Betterman’s dicta that sentencing
delay could violate the Due Process Clause and citing Ray for the proposition that Lovasco should
be used to analyze the due process claim); Ray, 578 F.3d at 199 (rejecting the Speedy Trial Clause
prior to Betterman and applying the Due Process Clause).
222. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789–94 (1977) (distinguishing precharge
delay from the right to a speedy trial and defining the relevant interests to be considered); Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519–22 (1972) (describing how the right to a speedy trial is different than
all other rights and describing the interests at stake).
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1. The Barker Factors
In Betterman, Justice Sotomayor suggested that the Barker
factors promote interests similar to those at stake at sentencing223—
Barker seeks to promote decency and fairness, ensure efficiency
through prompt adjudication, protect the public from additional harm
by criminals who are not confined during adjudication, and prevent any
“detrimental effect on rehabilitation.”224 Additionally, Justice Ginsburg
referenced all four Barker factors in a footnote as potentially “relevant
considerations,” albeit without a citation to Barker.225 Although she did
not endorse the test as explicitly as Justice Sotomayor did, some
commentators have suggested that the majority’s reference all but
confirms Barker’s application to a speedy sentencing Due Process
Clause analysis.226
Further, many courts have already applied Barker in the
sentencing context,227 lending credence to its applicability. Although
some courts applied Barker under a Speedy Trial Clause analysis,
others have found that Barker is appropriate to analyze due process
claims.228 As discussed in Section II.A.3, the Burkett court held that the
Due Process Clause applies to postconviction delays and examined
speedy trial and due process claims together under Barker.229
Concededly, Burkett was explicitly concerned with due process rights
affected by the delay in Burkett’s appeal, which was caused by his
delayed sentence.230 Nevertheless, the concerns raised by delay in an
appeal and sentencing are not so disparate—after all, one concern with
sentencing delays is that they impede a defendant’s ability to appeal.231

223. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1619 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
224. Barker, 407 U.S. at 519–20.
225. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1618 n.12 (“Relevant considerations may include the
length of and reasons for delay, the defendant’s diligence in requesting expeditious sentencing,
and prejudice.”).
226. See Little, supra note 166.
227. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1619 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (asserting that the
majority of circuits have applied Barker to speedy sentencing claims); see also cases cited supra
note 105 (applying the Barker factors to speedy sentencing claims before Betterman, albeit under
the Speedy Trial Clause); supra Section II.B.1 (describing cases applying the Barker factors to due
process challenges to sentencing delay after Betterman).
228. See, e.g., Burkett II, 951 F.2d 1431, 1438 (3d Cir. 1991) (using the Barker factors to
analyze undue delay in sentencing under the Speedy Trial Clause and the Due Process Clause).
229. Burkett I, 826 F.2d 1208, 1221–22 (3d Cir. 1987).
230. See United States v. Zamichieli, No. 12-182, 2016 WL 3519550, at *8 (E.D. Pa. June 27,
2016) (“[T]he Burkett I court was specifically addressing Fourteenth Amendment due process
concerns resulting from unreasonable delays in the appellate process . . . .”).
231. See id. (stating that despite the slight factual difference, Burkett still demonstrates the
applicability of the Barker factors to a speedy sentencing due process claim).
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As such, cases like Burkett demonstrate that Barker may be a suitable
framework for a due process speedy sentencing claim.
Applying Barker to the sentencing context may, however,
present some drawbacks. First, Barker’s factors are part of a balancing
test, in which no single factor—length of delay, reason for delay,
assertion of right, or prejudice to the defendant—functions as necessary
or sufficient to finding a violation.232 Instead, a court must engage in a
case-by-case
review,
considering
each
factor
under
the
circumstances.233 In one sense, this lends itself well to sentencing delays
by providing courts with flexibility to engage in circumstantial
review.234 Courts that have applied Barker to sentencing, however,
demonstrate that few claims succeed under its balancing test, as
evidenced by those courts that have applied its factors to sentencing.235
This poor success rate might suggest that the Barker balancing test
does not provide a meaningful review of the harm that undue delay
imposes on defendants. The Lovasco test, however, probably cannot
resolve this problem either.236
Second, as Justice Thomas pointed out in his Betterman
concurrence, the Barker factors might not lend themselves well to
claims of delayed sentencing.237 Barker’s factors were fashioned to
address the unique concerns raised by trial delays,238 which are not
always present in the sentencing context. For instance, the Barker
Court noted that the defendant can use delay in the trial phase to his
benefit.239 The defendant may be able to exploit court backlog to
negotiate better pleas or delay in the hope that incriminating witnesses
may become unavailable or forget important facts as time passes.240
Additionally, society bears the cost of incarcerating a presumptively
innocent individual—both directly, in paying to house the defendant in
jail, and indirectly, as the defendant’s family may be forced to rely on
welfare if its main wage earner remains in jail for an extended period

232. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972).
233. Id.
234. Saetveit, supra note 100, at 508.
235. See WRIGHT & WELLING, supra note 61, § 524 n.18 (collecting speedy sentencing cases
that failed under Barker); see also United States v. James, 712 F. App’x 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2017)
(asserting that claims that fail under Barker would fail under any other test).
236. See infra notes 270–271 and accompanying text.
237. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1618 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring).
238. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 519, 530–33 (explaining that the speedy trial right is different
than other constitutional rights and describing the rationale behind the four Barker factors).
239. Id. at 519 (noting that defendants can manipulate the system and that the delay might
work to a defendant’s advantage).
240. Id. at 519–20.
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of time.241 Conversely, defendants who are already convicted are unable
to negotiate favorable plea deals. Furthermore, a sentencing proceeding
is not an opportunity for the defendant to retry his conviction, and thus
concerns about witness reliability are less relevant.242 And, perhaps
most important to the Betterman Court, the defendant is no longer
presumed innocent during sentencing.243 Accordingly, while it is true
that society still must bear the expense of the defendant’s incarceration
and any attendant costs, these expenses would burden society
regardless of the speed with which a defendant is sentenced.244
Some of Barker’s other concerns about a speedy trial, however,
are relevant in the sentencing context. Barker points out that a
defendant who is released on bail while awaiting trial may commit
additional crimes.245 This same concern applies if a defendant is out on
bail pending his sentencing. Additionally, recall that Barker was
particularly concerned with prejudice: the Court sought to protect the
defendant from oppressive incarceration, minimize the defendant’s
anxiety, and ensure the defendant’s case is not impaired.246 Barker
emphasized that prejudice due to impairment of the defendant’s case is
the most pressing concern because the ability of a defendant to put on
a complete and accurate defense is key to maintaining a fair criminal
system.247 Admittedly, impairment is not as pertinent of a concern to a
defendant who is already convicted.248 Defendants at the sentencing
phase have already presented their defenses and been found guilty;
thus, delay cannot impair their defenses. Sentencing may, however,
involve additional factfinding to determine an appropriate sentence,
241. See id. (listing the various interests affected by delay).
242. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 19, § 26.4(f) (explaining that defendants’ rights to confront
and cross-examine witnesses at sentencing is limited). Of course, as explained below, if a defendant
successfully appeals a conviction, witness reliability would become relevant, and any delay in
sentencing would contribute to a delay in ultimately retrying the case. See Burkett II, 951 F.2d
1431, 1445–46 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting delay would be relevant to an appeal and subsequent new
trial).
243. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1616 (2016) (holding that presumption of innocence
does not extend to sentencing and noting that the question of guilt is not addressed at sentencing,
as it has already been established).
244. In egregious circumstances, the delay in sentencing could exceed the time that a
defendant is ultimately sentenced to serve in prison. In such cases, society would actually be
burdened by the sentencing delay, because the defendant was incarcerated longer than necessary.
I have not come across such an example, however, and accordingly deduce that this would be a
rare occurrence, if it happens at all.
245. Barker, 407 U.S. at 519.
246. Saetveit, supra note 100, at 501.
247. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 (unequivocally stating that impairment of the defense is the
“most serious” concern).
248. See Burkett II, 951 F.2d 1431, 1442 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he Supreme Court stated that the
Barker v. Wingo factors assume a different (presumably lesser) stature where the defendant is
incarcerated after conviction . . . .” (citing Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973))).
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and delay may hinder the defendant’s ability to represent these facts
correctly. The Burkett court also pointed out that delayed sentencing
could impair a defendant’s ability to reconstruct his defense if
successful on appeal.249 Moreover, the Supreme Court has cautioned
courts not to overlook the defendant’s interest in parole and meaningful
rehabilitation, which suggests that Barker’s concerns about oppressive
incarceration and the defendant’s anxiety relate to sentencing as
well.250
2. The Lovasco Test
The Lovasco test was intended to analyze Due Process Clause
violations regarding undue delay at the precharge stage, not
postconviction.251 Thus, like Barker, the Lovasco test traditionally
applies when the defendant is presumed innocent, a presumption that
does not exist at sentencing.252 Addressing this distinction, the
Betterman Court asserted that defendants’ due process rights diminish
after conviction in light of their presumed guilt, but those rights are
still present nonetheless.253 The Court confirmed, however, that
defendants are entitled to sentencing that is “fundamentally fair.”254
Lovasco also focuses on societal concepts of fairness and
decency.255 It asks the court to determine “whether the action
complained of . . . violates those ‘fundamental conceptions of justice
which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions,’ and which
define ‘the community’s sense of fair play and decency.’ ”256 Courts have
interpreted the two prongs of Lovasco to require defendants show both
(1) prejudice to the defendant and (2) bad faith on the government’s

249. See id. at 1445–46 (reporting Burkett’s concern that delay in his sentencing created
uncertainty in when his appeal would be decided and damaged his ability to reconstruct his
defense).
250. Moore, 414 U.S. at 27.
251. Little, supra note 166.
252. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 784 (1977) (describing the precharge delay at
issue); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Betterman v. Montana and the Underenforcement of Constitutional
Rights at Sentencing, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 323, 325 (2016) (“After all, trials exist to determine
guilt or innocence. . . . In contrast, guilt is a forgone conclusion at sentencing . . . .”).
253. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1617 (2016).
254. Id.
255. See State v. Lopez, 410 P.3d 226, 233 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017) (asserting Lovasco is well
suited to analyze whether sentencing delay violates due process rights).
256. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790 (citation omitted) (first quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.
103, 112 (1935); and then quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952)).
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behalf.257 The defendant thus carries the heavy burden of establishing
two essential elements, neither of which is particularly easy to prove.258
As such, Lovasco offers courts less flexibility in their analyses
than Barker does, and it may impose an overly robust hurdle for
defendants alleging sentencing delay. It also fails to explicitly address
the length of the delay, perhaps suggesting it is ill equipped to handle
complaints by defendants awaiting the final disposition of their cases.259
Of course, the length of the delay factors into the prejudice prong, but
Lovasco does not place as much emphasis on length of time as Barker
does.260 But unlike Barker, Lovasco was actually designed to analyze
due process claims,261 which is the generally accepted constitutional
challenge to delayed sentencing now that Betterman rejected a Speedy
Trial Clause challenge.262 And Lovasco has a stated interest in
fundamental fairness, a concept emphasized by Betterman.263
Nevertheless, Barker is not entirely devoid of this principle, asserting a
“general concern that all accused persons be treated according to decent
and fair procedures.”264
Another problem with Lovasco is that the behavior it seeks to
deter is not entirely consistent with the sentencing context. Lovasco
was specifically concerned with balancing the discretion of the
prosecutor and the efficacy of filing charges against the prejudice to the
accused.265 The Court sought to ensure that prosecutors had the
discretion to file charges only when they believed they had probable
cause and the ability to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.266 It
balanced this against the fact that delay might necessarily prejudice
the defendant—for example, by impairing his defense.267 Under

257. See United States v. Sanders, 452 F.3d 572, 581 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that defendant’s
claim failed Lovasco, as he did not provide affirmative evidence of bad faith).
258. See id. at 580–81 (describing defendant’s heavy burdens to show (1) he suffered prejudice
due to a fundamentally unfair process and (2) the government purposefully caused the delay).
259. Notwithstanding the extreme impact of the length of time on the defendant, there is also
the possibility that the sentence could be shorter than the delay. Saetveit, supra note 100, at 502.
260. See Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789–90 (“Actual prejudice to the defense of a criminal case may
result from the shortest and most necessary delay . . . .”).
261. See State v. Lopez, 410 P.3d 226, 233 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017) (attesting to the suitability of
Lovasco’s due process framework to examine sentencing delay).
262. See cases cited supra notes 168–169 (collecting post-Betterman cases addressing
constitutional challenges to delayed sentencing).
263. See Lopez, 410 P.3d at 233 (pointing to Lovasco’s consideration of fair play and decency).
264. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972).
265. See Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790–94 (describing the rationale and benefits of the prosecution’s
decision to bring charges at various points and the effect on defendant).
266. See id.
267. See id. at 785–86, 796 (holding that although defendant may have been “somewhat
prejudiced” by delay that caused him to lose a potentially material witness, that determination did
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Lovasco, some prejudice is not enough to establish a due process
violation without a showing of bad faith by the prosecutor.268 This
careful balance between ensuring evidentiary sufficiency and deterring
illegitimate precharge delay is not applicable to sentencing. The
prosecutor has long since decided to bring charges at the point that the
defendant awaits sentencing, so questions of probable cause and
reasonable doubt are moot. And, as discussed in Section III.A.1, the
threat to the accuracy of a defendant’s case is generally not as
pronounced at sentencing as it is in preparing for trial.269 Lastly, some
commentators have noted that the speedy trial right is a more concrete
and robust right than the due process right.270 Thus, applying the
traditional due process framework of Lovasco might provide less
protection than Barker, which is traditionally designed to serve Speedy
Trial Clause claims.271
B. Analyzing Remedies for Speedy Sentencing Violations
Part of the Betterman Court’s resistance to a Sixth Amendment
analysis was the remedy—violation of the Speedy Trial Clause
mandates dismissal of the case against the defendant.272 But Betterman
did not seek that remedy: he requested a reduction of his sentence.273
One scholar has questioned why the Betterman Court could not have
simply fashioned a new remedy to suit the particular harm Betterman
suffered.274 Another commentator has suggested that the Court
deliberately avoided the possibility that the charges could be dismissed
without prejudice and subsequently refiled, such that dismissal would
not have been the “unjustified windfall” that Justice Ginsburg
apparently feared.275 Of course, dismissal without prejudice might

not justify finding a violation when the investigation by the government had been undertaken in
good faith).
268. See United States v. Sanders, 452 F.3d 572, 581 (6th Cir. 2006) (declining to find a due
process violation under Lovasco when the defendant failed to affirmatively show bad faith by the
government).
269. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
270. See Hessick, supra note 252, at 334 (stating that the Due Process Clause right at
sentencing is likely to be more case specific and more difficult to enforce than a bright-line rule
like the speedy trial right).
271. See id. (“It is unclear whether defendants will fare as well under the Due Process Clause
as they might have had the Court gone the other way in Betterman.”).
272. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2016).
273. Hessick, supra note 252, at 331 (citing Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1615 n.6).
274. See id. at 330–31 (“It is unclear why the Court’s past practice in speedy trial cases must
govern all future cases. Courts often use their inherent power to fashion remedies to address the
precise nature of harm suffered in a particular case.”).
275. Little, supra note 166.
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defeat the interest in judicial efficiency described in Barker,276 but it
would render dismissal of charges a less extreme remedy. Finally, some
courts have considered a sentence vacatur an appropriate remedy in the
due process context as well, the value of which is worth addressing in
particularly egregious circumstances, like in Ray.277
Traditionally, the only remedy available under Barker is
dismissal of the defendant’s charges.278 The Betterman Court rejected
this particular bright-line approach to remedying sentencing delays.279
It is curious, then, why both the Betterman majority (implicitly) and
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence (explicitly) proposed using the Barker
factors to analyze a claim of undue delay under the Due Process
Clause280 rather than using the more traditional Lovasco due process
framework. Perhaps this suggests that although the Court rejects a rule
that mandates dismissal of charges, it generally supports a more
consistent, bright-line approach than the more amorphous Lovasco
remedy281—that is, to simply fashion a remedy to counteract the
amount of prejudice suffered by the defendant.282 Adopting this sort of
case-by-case analysis would allow courts to individualize remedies, but
it would also lead to inconsistency.283
One suggestion is to implement a bright-line rule where, in the
case of undue delay, a court automatically imposes the minimum
sentence to which the conviction exposes the defendant.284 This
approach could be problematic for a variety of reasons. On the one hand,
judges might seek to protect their discretion and, as a workaround,
decline to find delay in the first place. On the other hand, even if a
minimum-sentence remedy was imposed, it fails to address the
individual circumstances of each defendant and each case. As a result,
this remedy might seem either excessive or insufficient relative to the
harm caused by delay. Additionally, a minimum-sentence rule would
not provide an adequate remedy for cases where the delay exceeds the
minimum. Damages might be one way to supplement this approach in
276. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972).
277. See United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 202–03 (2d Cir. 2009) (essentially vacating the
defendant’s sentence after she served one day in prison but still had three years of supervised time
and six months in a halfway house yet to be served).
278. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439 (1973) (holding that for a Speedy Trial Clause
violation, “dismissal must remain, as Barker noted, ‘the only possible remedy’ ” (quoting Barker,
407 U.S. at 522)).
279. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2016).
280. Id. at 1618 n.12; id. at 1619 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
281. See Saetveit, supra note 100, at 494–95 (noting Lovasco’s strong emphasis on prejudice
and fairness and the vague instruction in forming a remedy to fit the prejudice).
282. Id. at 495 (quoting Ray, 578 F.3d at 202).
283. Id. at 508.
284. Id. at 504.
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such circumstances, but it is unlikely that defendants would consider
money an adequate remedy for unjust incarceration.285
Taking a different tack, Justice Thomas recommended that
defendants could petition for a writ of mandamus,286 a command from
the reviewing court to compel certain action by the lower court or
government actor.287 A writ pertaining to delayed sentencing typically
compels the trial court to set a prompt sentencing hearing when there
has been extreme delay.288 Unfortunately, this remedy fails to account
for the harm already suffered by the defendant or address situations
where the delay exceeds any possible sentence.
IV. A MODEST PROPOSAL: APPLYING BARKER TO SPEEDY
SENTENCING CLAIMS
This Note proposes that speedy sentencing claims be analyzed
under the Due Process Clause and that courts apply the Barker
balancing test to determine whether there has been undue delay. A
more flexible remedy, however, is called for—something more akin to
the flexible relief under Lovasco than the automatic dismissal
mandated by Barker.289 The default remedy for finding a violation
should be to reduce the defendant’s sentence in an amount equal to the
delay. This default, however, can be overcome by a clear showing that
the interests of justice would not be served by the default remedy, in
which case a court could fashion appropriate relief in a more free-form
fashion.

285. Id. at 502–03. Damages cannot negate the psychological damage of incarceration or the
hurdles of reentering society. Cf. Leslie Scott, “It Never, Ever Ends”: The Psychological Impact of
Wrongful Conviction, CRIM. L. BRIEF, Spring 2010, at 10, 10 (discussing exonerees’ struggles with
the stigma of conviction, struggles to find work, difficulties reentering family life and society
generally, and resulting mental-health issues). Even if awarded, the appropriate amount of
damages is challenging to determine and may be considered monetarily insufficient to compensate
for the harm suffered. Cf. Erik Encarnacion, Backpay for Exonerees, 29 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 245,
259 (2017) (comparing the difficulty of awarding damages to exonerees to the challenges of
damages in wrongful death suits).
286. Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1618 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring).
287. Mandamus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
288. See United States v. Yelverton, 197 F.3d 531, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that Yelverton
failed to “seek mandamus from this court to compel the district court to impose [his] sentence”).
289. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972) (explaining that finding a violation of the
Speedy Trial Clause leads to the severe remedy of dismissal of the charge).
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A. An Argument for Applying the Barker Factors to
Claims of Undue Delay
The Supreme Court has recommended, albeit in dicta, that
courts employ the Barker factors to postconviction claims of delay.290
Many courts previously employed Barker to analyze speedy sentencing
claims under the Speedy Trial Clause,291 and following Betterman, some
courts have applied Barker to speedy sentencing claims under the Due
Process Clause.292 Advocates would be wise to heed the Supreme Court’s
suggestion in this regard, as it presents the best indication of the
Court’s approach to finding a constitutional speedy sentencing right.
After all, the Justices presumably refrained from explicitly endorsing a
due process analysis only because Betterman presented solely a Sixth
Amendment Speedy Trial Clause question.293 And as one scholar
pointed out, it would not be outlandish for defendants to successfully
assert a constitutional right at sentencing under the Due Process
Clause—courts have previously found other sentencing rights under
that clause, such as the right to be sentenced without consideration of
race.294
As the Third Circuit has demonstrated, Barker’s four factors—
length of delay, reason for the delay, defendant’s assertion of his right,
and prejudice to the defendant—could easily be adapted to
sentencing.295 As a flexible balancing test, Barker allows for an ad hoc
consideration of each factor.296 No one factor is considered necessary or
sufficient to find a violation of a defendant’s right, and each factor is
considered under the circumstances of the case.297 For example, in
James, the delay was quite long (fourteen months), which weighed
against the government; but the reason for delay was largely
attributable to the defendants, who did not demand sentencing and
290. See supra notes 160–166 and accompanying text.
291. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1619 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“The majority of the
Circuits in fact use the Barker test for that purpose.”); Saetveit, supra note 100, at 491–92
(collecting cases applying Barker to speedy sentencing claims).
292. See cases cited supra notes 168–169.
293. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1612 (“Brandon Betterman, however, advanced in this
Court only a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim. He did not preserve a due process challenge.
We, therefore, confine this opinion to his Sixth Amendment challenge.” (citation omitted)).
294. See Hessick, supra note 252, at 334 (explaining that finding constitutional rights at
sentencing under the Due Process Clause is “hardly new” and providing the example of courts that
reversed sentences based on race as violative of due process rather than equal protection).
295. See United States v. James, 712 F. App’x 154, 161–63 (3d Cir. 2017) (employing the
Barker factors to analyze a due process speedy sentencing claim).
296. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529–30, 533 (1972) (rejecting an inflexible approach
and endorsing a balancing test that considers the circumstances of the case).
297. Id. at 533.
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largely benefitted from the delay.298 Barker also allows different weight
to be given to factors depending on the circumstances—for example,
more neutral reasons for delay, such as backlogged courts, still weigh
slightly against the government, but not as much as an intentional,
tactical delay.299 Indeed, in James, the government caused some delay
in responding to discovery requested by one of the defendants—the
court noted that this weighed slightly against the government, but not
as heavily as deliberately impeding the process.300
Such careful balancing incentivizes the government to be
proactive in seeking prompt sentencing without punishing the
government whenever some delay arises. James exemplifies a case with
various reasons for delay: a complex restitution calculation, the
preparation of a presentence report based on those calculations, a
defendant’s discovery requests, and the judge’s illness all delayed the
sentencing hearing.301 Although the defendants made some valid claims
of prejudice, a number of considerations cut against their case: they did
not assert their rights for nearly the entirety of the delay; they
personally benefitted from a reduction in restitution due to revised
calculations; and the length of time was not unreasonable, considering
the preparation required.302 James thus demonstrates another benefit
of applying Barker in this context—it incentivizes defendants to assert
their rights instead of trying to manipulate the system by prolonging
their own sentencing and then complaining of delay, since their
assertion of a right to prompt sentencing is a factor.303 In light of Cain304
and Lopez,305 it is clear that this Barker factor is important to
postconviction delays: even though these cases purportedly applied the
Lovasco test, both courts looked to the defendant’s assertion of right, a

298. See 712 F. App’x at 162–63 (going through the four Barker factors and finding that the
defendants’ rights were not violated).
299. See 407 U.S. at 531 (“A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the
defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as
negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be
considered . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
300. See 712 F. App’x at 162 (contrasting deliberate delay with a good faith effort to respond
to discovery).
301. See id. at 162–63 (employing the Barker factors to analyze a due process claim regarding
sentencing delay and finding no violation).
302. See id. (holding that the defendants’ rights were not violated even though they
experienced some prejudice, as that minimal showing alone was not dispositive).
303. See id. (explaining that the defendants did not assert their rights until one month before
the sentencing hearing, after a full year of them not complaining and in fact seeking delay
themselves).
304. United States v. Cain, 734 F. App’x 21 (2d Cir. 2018).
305. State v. Lopez, 410 P.3d 226 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017).

Grimsdale_Galley (Do Not Delete)

2019]

THE BETTER WAY TO STOP DELAY

4/28/2019 3:13 PM

1069

traditional Barker factor, in concluding that there was no speedy
sentencing violation.306
The flexibility of the Barker factors can be contrasted with the
rigidity of Lovasco’s two-prong test. Under Lovasco, both the improper
reason and prejudice prongs are necessary to finding undue delay—
even if a defendant demonstrates “actual and substantial prejudice,”
relief will not be granted if there was a “legitimate reason for the
delay.”307 Lovasco essentially requires bad faith on the government’s
behalf.308 This could be particularly troubling in cases with long
institutional delays, such as those caused by understaffed courts. For
example, consider a case in a small rural town with a defendant who
cannot make bail and sits in jail, awaiting sentencing for a low-level
crime. He might wait an inordinately long time if a judge falls ill,
emergency cases arise, or the staff member conducting his presentence
report unexpectedly quits. Even if the defendant makes frequent
requests for sentencing and shows he suffered an inability to participate
in substance-abuse counseling, his claim might fail under Lovasco.
Although he might have suffered prejudice, there are legitimate reasons
for delay.309 Courts have distinguished such institutional delays from
those that are “purposeful or oppressive.”310 Institutional delay, if
particularly egregious, is still not “acceptable,” but courts applying
Lovasco seem to counteract “unacceptable” yet unintentional delay by
finding that the defendant failed to prove prejudice.311
Lovasco’s requirement for actual, demonstrable prejudice sets it
apart from Barker and makes it a poor fit for the sentencing context.
Cases adhering to Lovasco often find that the defendant’s alleged
prejudice is too “speculative,” particularly when the prejudice the
defendant alleges is ineligibility for release or lack of access to

306. See Cain, 734 F. App’x at 25–26 (describing Cain’s multiple pro se requests for
resentencing); Lopez, 410 P.3d at 233–34 (explaining that the defendant actually requested more
time to get his affairs in order prior to sentencing and did not make any effort to seek his
presentence report).
307. Betterman I, 342 P.3d 971, 979 (Mont. 2015) (quoting United States v. L’Allier, 838 F.2d
234, 238 (7th Cir. 1988)).
308. See United States v. Sanders, 452 F.3d 572, 581 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the defendant’s
due process claim when he failed to affirmatively show bad faith by the government).
309. See Betterman I, 342 P.3d at 979 (interpreting Lovasco to require both improper reasons
for delay and prejudice for due process claims).
310. See, e.g., id. at 981.
311. See Cain, 734 F. App’x at 25–26 (denying the defendant’s claims because the prejudice he
alleged was too speculative but noting that the government and district court bore responsibility
for their negligence in scheduling sentencing); Betterman I, 342 P.3d at 980–81 (concluding that
fourteen months of institutional delay was “unacceptable” but that Betterman’s prejudice was
neither substantial nor demonstrable when he complained of an inability to access rehabilitation
services and ineligibility for conditional discharge).
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rehabilitative services that local jails do not offer.312 This outcome is
problematic, as claims of this nature go to the very heart of why delayed
sentencing is troubling in the first place: sitting in local jail inhibits
defendants’ ability to rehabilitate and reenter society.313 In contrast,
cases relying on Barker have recognized the following as legitimate
claims of prejudice: future participation in rehabilitative programs,
eligibility for expanded visitation rights, and potentially missed
opportunities like concurrent sentences.314 The Barker Court also
explicitly recognized county jails as “deplorable” places, stating that
time spent there was effectively “dead time.”315 Finally, the Barker
Court was cognizant of the fact that defendants might not always be
able to affirmatively demonstrate what they have lost through delay—
for example, Barker recognizes that witnesses’ memories may fade, but
this is “not always reflected in the record because what has been
forgotten can rarely be shown.”316 In the sentencing context, it would be
similarly difficult for defendants to prove that they would be eligible for
release or could have rehabilitated more but for being kept in local jails
without access to those opportunities—it is impossible to show the
benefit of something that was unavailable in the first place. Barker and
Lovasco may seem relatively similar, but in practice, Lovasco would
likely make it unnecessarily difficult for defendants to succeed on
speedy sentencing claims.317
312. See, e.g., Cain, 734 F. App’x at 26 (finding alleged prejudice too speculative when
defendant asserted he could have been released sooner if sentencing was not delayed); Betterman
I, 342 P.3d at 980–81 (rejecting Betterman’s due process claim as “speculative” and concluding
that Betterman’s prejudice was “not substantial and demonstrable” when he claimed an inability
to access rehabilitative services available at the Department of Corrections); see also United States
v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325–26 (1971) (explaining that the defendants did not demonstrate actual
prejudice and the due process claims are thus “speculative and premature”).
313. See supra Section I.B.
314. See Burkett II, 951 F.2d 1431, 1443 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding merit in Burkett’s reported
prejudice and “credit[ing] Burkett’s assertions that access to rehabilitative programs and the
opportunity for more liberal visitation privileges are an appealing and legitimately valid
alternative to the limbo he experienced in the county system”); Burkett I, 826 F.2d 1208, 1223–24
(3d Cir. 1987) (explaining that Burkett suffered prejudice from potentially losing part of an
opportunity for concurrent sentencing).
315. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 520, 532–33 (1972).
316. Id. at 532.
317. See 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 19, § 18.5(b) (“It can certainly be argued that the Lovasco
rule is too demanding.”); see also id.:
Some lower courts have read Lovasco to mean that once the defendant proves prejudice,
then “the burden shifts” to the prosecution to show a valid reason for the delay. This is
a sensible allocation of the burden, for the reasons underlying the delay are peculiarly
within the knowledge of the prosecution. Nonetheless, the prevailing view is that the
defendant must shoulder this burden as well. It is not an easy burden to meet, especially
because there is no discernible inclination of the lower courts to treat anything except
an intent to hamper the defense as an improper reason.
(footnotes omitted).
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B. Applying Default Remedies with Ad Hoc Remedies
Available as a Backstop
While Barker’s factors are well suited to the postconviction
setting, its bright-line remedy requiring dismissal of charges is not.318
Instead, a finding of undue postconviction delay should warrant default
remedies. Lovasco’s more amorphous remedial approach, however,
should be available in circumstances where default remedies cannot, or
should not, be applied under the particular facts of the case.
If a court finds undue delay under the Barker factors, the default
remedy should be a reduction in the sentence by the amount of undue
delay.319 This reduction should be distinguished from the credit granted
for time served, which is the routine procedure of counting the time the
defendant serves while awaiting sentencing toward satisfaction of the
sentence ultimately prescribed.320 State and federal statutes typically
provide for this process.321 To illustrate this Note’s proposal, consider a
defendant who was sentenced to thirty years but was subjected to an
undue two-year delay while incarcerated and awaiting sentencing. The
judge would reduce the defendant’s sentence to twenty-eight years as a
remedy for the undue delay. Under existing sentencing procedures, the
defendant would generally receive time-served credit as well, such that
the two years spent incarcerated would be counted toward satisfying
his reduced sentence of twenty-eight years. Accordingly, this defendant
would still need to serve twenty-six years after his sentencing hearing.
If such a default remedy is impossible to effectuate under the
circumstances or would clearly not serve the interests of justice, the
court would be permitted to fashion a flexible remedy under Lovasco’s
ad hoc approach to appropriately address the prejudice suffered by the
defendant.322 For example, if the amount of delay exceeds the sentence,
it would be impossible to reduce the sentence by the amount of delay,
and the defendant would not be properly recompensed. Consider a
defendant sentenced to six months of incarceration after an undue two318. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2016) (referring to dismissal of a charge for
postconviction delay as an “unjustified windfall”).
319. See Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1447 (using a sentence reduction as a remedy).
320. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1617 n.9 (“Because postconviction incarceration is
considered punishment for the offense, however, a defendant will ordinarily earn time-served
credit for any period of presentencing detention.”).
321. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2012) (describing how defendants should be given credit for time
“spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences”); Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at
1617 n.9 (“[State c]rediting statutes routinely provide that any period of time during which a
person was incarcerated in relation to a given offense be counted toward satisfaction of any
resulting sentence.” (alteration in original) (quoting ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING
§ 9:28, at 444–45 & n.4 (3d ed. 2004))).
322. See Saetveit, supra note 100, at 495 (describing the remedy for a due process violation).
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year delay in jail awaiting sentencing. Under this Note’s proposal, his
sentence should be reduced by two years (the amount of time caused by
undue delay), but this is impossible—the defendant cannot serve a
negative one-and-a-half-year sentence. In practice, the defendant would
typically be released right away because the time-served credit for the
defendant’s two-year incarceration surpasses his six-month sentence.323
In other words, the defendant’s sentence has already been served. Even
so, the defendant in this situation has not been recompensed for the
undue delay he suffered, because he cannot regain the time he lost in
jail. Additionally, there might be a circumstance in which the delay in
sentencing is very lengthy and would thus warrant a significant
sentence reduction. But suppose the defendant is out on bail during the
delay and commits another serious crime while sentencing is pending.
Justice would not be served by rewarding such an individual with a
substantially reduced sentence.
In sum, both Barker and Lovasco contribute important
rationales to the treatment of postconviction delay—while Barker’s
factors are better suited for analyzing sentencing delay, Lovasco’s ad
hoc approach to relief may inform an appropriate remedy for undue
postconviction delay.
CONCLUSION
It is true that by the time defendants have reached the
sentencing phase of their criminal proceedings, they are no longer
presumed innocent.324 Nevertheless, as Betterman acknowledges,
defendants still retain a right to fundamentally fair sentencing
proceedings.325 As such, the criminal justice system, and society
generally, should be concerned with any oppressive delays.326 By
holding that the Speedy Trial Clause does not apply to sentencing, the
Betterman Court rejected the possibility that courts could automatically
remedy sentencing delays by dismissing cases outright.327 It did not,

323. See supra note 321 (providing the federal and state statutory bases for routinely applying
time-served credit).
324. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1613–14, 1617 (dividing criminal proceedings into three
stages—prearrest, arrest to conviction, and postconviction—and noting that the presumption of
innocence detaches after conviction).
325. Id. at 1617.
326. See United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 199 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that the Due Process
Clause prohibits oppressive delay).
327. See Betterman II, 136 S. Ct. at 1615 (“The sole remedy for a violation of the speedy trial
right—dismissal of the charges—fits the preconviction focus of the Clause. It would be an
unjustified windfall, in most cases, to remedy sentencing delay by vacating validly obtained
convictions.” (citations omitted)).
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however, foreclose the prospect that the same factors applied to Speedy
Trial Clause violations could be used to analyze due process violations
in the sentencing context.328 This Note proposes applying the Barker
factors to claims of unduly delayed sentencing but allowing for a more
suitable remedy. This solution acknowledges that sentencing delays
implicate many of the same concerns as delaying a defendant’s trial
while also recognizing that a defendant’s interests, though present, are
not as acute as they are at the trial stage. Thus, it bridges the gap
between the unsatisfactory remedy of dismissal that Speedy Trial
Clause claims demand329 and affording a defendant protection of a due
process right to prompt sentencing.
Sarah R. Grimsdale*

328. Indeed, Betterman endorsed this proposal. See id. at 1618 n.12 (implicitly endorsing the
Barker factors); id. at 1619 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (explicitly endorsing the Barker factors).
329. Betterman, of course, explicitly rejected dismissal in the speedy sentencing context. Id. at
1612 (majority opinion).
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